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Abstract 
            This dissertation examines advances in applied discrete choice econometrics in applied 
settings and conservation practice adoptions by Kansas farmers. The research contributes to the 
literature by examining the use of discrete choice models to more deeply examine adoption of 
conservation practices and the choice of crop rotations in Kansas. In addition, a method for 
examining the proper functional specification of logistic regression models is explored.  
            The first essay aims to examine landscape, climatic, socio-economic and farm factors 
affecting choice of crop rotations by farm managers in dryland cropping systems. A particular 
emphasis is place on the role, insurance products (such as RA-CRC (Revenue Assurance/Crop 
Revenue Coverage) and ACRE (Average Crop Revenue Election)), as well as marketing options, 
and characteristics of farming operations. This paper models the joint adoption of crop rotations 
using a multinomial modeling framework which is used to estimate the probabilities of adopting 
different crop rotations. The data used for this paper was obtained from a mail survey in 2011 
examining Kansas farmers’ land use decisions and consisted of an eight-page survey with 46 
questions, leading to more than 400 distinct variables.   
            The purpose of the second essay is to examine and analyze the adoption of conservation 
practices, no-till, cover crops and use of crediting of nutrients from manure, by Kansas farmers 
from both a joint and conditional perspective. This study develops a modeling framework that 
can analyze conditional adoption and examine farmers’ joint and conditional adoption decisions. 
Estimates calculated from the model will allow for an assessment of the linkages between the 
adoption of different conservation practices, as well as the socio-economic factors that affect the 
likelihood of adopting conservation practices given other conservation practices have already 
been adopted on-farm.  
  
            The third essay aims to develop a robust test to examine the functional form of predictor/ 
index function in the logistic regression models as misspecified models can lead to biased and 
inconsistent estimates, and consequently inappropriate inferences. An Orthogonal Polynomial 
RESET test is developed to assess proper functional form for different functional form 
assumptions of the predictor/ index function, as well as provide guidance on the use of the test in 
applied logistic regression modeling. Monte Carlo Simulations are used to assess the viability of 
the test and compare it to similar tests found in the literature.      
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1.1 Introduction 
Farm operators use crop rotations to provide economic and environmental benefits to 
their crop production systems including balancing soil fertility, enhancing carbon storage, 
preventing disease and pest pressures, improving soil structure, and reducing soil erosion 
(McSorley and Gallaher, 1994; 1995; Miglierina et al., 2000; Al-Kaisi, 2004;). Every crop has 
different requirements for the various nutrients it needs. When one crop is planted in a field for a 
long time period, the crop will use nutrients (e.g. potassium) from the soil (Macy, 1936). 
However, if another crop is grown on the same field that needs different nutrients (e.g. 
phosphate), then the field has a chance to replenish its nutrients over time. Thus, soil fertility can 
be balanced and improved by the use of a crop rotation (Baligar, 2001).  
The life cycle of pests and harmful plant bacteria can be broken by crop rotation, as 
certain pests thrive only on certain crops (Hill, 1987). What’s more, crop rotation is important 
with regards to productivity, it can contribute to improved crop yields for crops in rotations, 
resulting in potentially higher returns for farm operators (Karlen et al., 2006; Triplett, 2008). 
Other advantages of crop rotations are: decreased risk under adverse conditions; reductions in 
peak labor times; and better distributions of labor throughout the year, if planting and harvest 
times are different (Wall and Thierfelder, 2009). Furthermore, crop rotations are required 
conservation practice for some conservation programs, e.g. the Conservations Stewardship 
Program (Bergtold and Molnar, 2010).  Rotation of crops is a potentially low cost conservation 
practice and the foundation for other conservation practices that may enhance the benefits of 
other conservation practices such as residue management, water management, crop nutrient 
management, and the use of cover crops (Witt et al., 2000; Shrestha et al., 2002; USDA-NRCS, 
2008).   
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Crop rotation has been widely studied in the literature for its ecological and economic 
efficiency. Some studies have focused on the effect of crop rotations on soil and weed 
management, (e.g. Tisdall and Oades, 1980; Campbell and Zentner, 1993; Liebman, Matt and 
Dyck, 1993; Sartori et al., 2005). Few analyses have studied crop insurance and its role on crop 
rotation decisions. Crop insurance has been available since the 1930s, but it was not until the 
1990s that the U.S. government emphasized the use of crop insurance by offering many new 
products and enhanced premium subsidization (Haken, 2012). Congress first authorized Federal 
crop insurance to help agricultural recover from the combined effects of the Great Depression 
and the Dust Bowl (Segal, 2005). The Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) was 
established by the Federal Crop Insurance Act (FCI Act) in 1938 to provide crop insurance for 
America farmers. Crop insurance contributes to: loan security for lenders; risk management for 
producers; flexibility and confidence to market crops (Haken, 2012). Agricultural producers face 
two important risks: yield risk and price risk. Farm operators can purchase crop insurance to 
reduce both these risks. Crop insurance protects against low yields due to unavoidable perils and 
protects adverse fluctuations in market prices. By 2001, 58% of federally insured wheat acres 
were cover by either Revenue Assurance or Crop Revenue Coverage (Nimon and Mishra, 2001). 
Revenue Assurance (RA) provides coverage to protect against loss of revenue caused by low 
prices or low yields or both. Revenue Assurance is available for barley, canola/rapeseed, cotton, 
corn, rice, soybean, sunflowers, and wheat (USDA, RMA). Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC) 
offers revenue protection based on price and yield expectations that pay for losses below the 
guarantee at the higher of an early-season price or the harvest price, if the harvest price option is 
selected. Crop Revenue Coverage is available for cotton, corn, grain, sorghum, rice, soybeans, 
and wheat (USDA, RMA). Under Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE), producers may 
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receive revenue-based payments as an alternative to receiving price-based counter-cyclical (CC) 
payments in addition to regular crop insurance products. Average Crop Revenue Election is 
available for wheat, barley, oats, sorghum, corn, cotton, soybeans, canola and peanuts (USDA, 
FSA).  
Chambers (1989), Nelson and Loehman (1987) both stated that if the crop insurance is 
fair enough and providing full coverage, then a risk-averse farmer will make the same production 
decisions as a risk-neutral one. As a result, insurance helps farm operators adopt more expensive 
and riskier crops. Hazell et al. (1986) found that the actuarially fair insurance product with full 
coverage lead to adopting riskier crops. Wu (1999) mentioned the importance of analyzing 
adverse selection as differently insured and uninsured farms in cropping patterns would reflect 
adverse selection. Adverse selection describes a situation that farmers’ demand for crop 
insurance is positively correlated with their risk of crop loss. Thus, it is highly likely that the 
availability and use of insurance products will directly impact the choice of crops in rotation. 
The purpose of this study is to examine landscape, climatic, socio-economic and farm 
factors affecting choice of crop rotations by farm managers in dryland cropping systems. A 
particular emphasis is place on the role, insurance products (such as RA-CRC (Revenue 
Assurance/Crop Revenue Coverage) and ACRE (Average Crop Revenue Election)), as well as 
marketing options, and characteristics of farming operations. The paper will employs a joint 
adoption approach of crop rotations using a multinomial modeling framework taking account of 
the endogeneity of the insurance and crop rotation choice. The framework is used to estimate the 
probabilities of adopting different crop rotations and impact of different factors. These estimates 
allow for an assessment of linkages between the adoption of crop insurance, as well as the socio-
economic factors that affect the likelihood of adopting different crop rotations.    
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1.2 Literature Review 
            Crop choice within rotations has been examined in a number of different studies. 
Campbell and Zentner (1993) did a crop rotation experiment in southwestern Saskatchewan and 
found soil organic matter in the well-fertilized fallow-winter cereal-wheat rotation remained the 
same because of the reduced soil erosion and more efficient use of nitrogen. Hennessey (2006) 
employed quasi-convex choice functions using a Markov-chain modeling framework to develop 
price-independent and price-dependent principles related to crop rotation. Seo and Mendelsohn 
(2008) examined crop choice adoption using a multinomial model in a joint framework to 
analyze Southern American farmers’ adaptation to climate change. Livingston et al. (2012) 
conducted a study examining crop choice and fertilizer applications using stochastic dynamic 
optimization. They parameterized a baseline model for a representative acre in Iowa and found 
crop rotations, regardless of prices, were extremely close to optimal. Du et al. (2012) used 
Markov chain models in a Bayesian framework to analyze how inputs affected crop yield 
skewness, which became more negative when the crop rotation was switched from corn-corn to 
corn-soybean, as corn yield skewness decreased with the increase in low levels of nitrogen use. 
More negative skewness would suggest larger indemnity payouts and extent of crop insurance 
subsidy costs.  
            A limited number of studies have examined the effect of crop insurance. Wu (1999) 
analyzed how crop insurance affected crop mix and chemical use in Central Nebraska. He found 
that crop insurance would shift land from hay and pasture to corn, and crop insurance lead to an 
increase in chemical use. Sherrick et al. (2004) employed a two-stage estimation procedure to 
analyze how farmers’ crop insurance decisions were influenced by risk perceptions, competing 
risk management options as well as structural and demographic differences. However, there are 
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few studies that examine the effect of crop insurance on crop rotations. This study aims to 
examine how crop rotation is affected by the use of insurance products, as well as marketing 
options, and characteristics of the farming operations. Stinner and House (1989) emphasized that 
famers must use a system approach by collecting all the interrelated factors together when 
addressing conservation needs. Pannell et al. (2006) reviewed a large number of these factors 
including farm demographics, farm characteristics, cultural barriers, social networks, farmer 
personalities, risk perceptions, economic well-being, land tenure and other socio-economic 
factors that may drive conservation practice adoption, including crop rotations and crop choices.     
1.3 Data  
            The data used for this paper was obtained from a mail survey in 2011 examining Kansas 
farmers’ land use decisions. The survey contained questions about how farmers make land-use 
decision on a wide array of topics. The survey asked respondents to address their goals in 
farming; participation in conservation programs; use of irrigation; willingness to grow biofuel 
crops; views related to price, yield, and weather risk; use of insurance and marketing options; 
and characteristics of the farming operations. The survey consisted of an eight-page survey with 
46 questions, leading to more than 400 distinct variables in the survey dataset. 
The survey targeted Kansas farmers with 50 or more acres of arable land and over 
$10,000 in gross farm annual income in 2010 to leave out hobby farmers and part-time 
producers. Names and addresses were obtained for approximately 23,000 farms meeting these 
criteria from FarmMarketID (a marketing technology company, www.FarmMarketID.com). A 
random sample of 10,000 farmers was drawn from the FarmMarketID data, and then sent to 
respondents following the approach suggested by Dillman (2007). A cover letter explaining the 
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purpose of the survey, the composition of the research team, how the survey results would be 
used, and how individual survey responses would be safeguard was included.   
A total of 2,317 surveys with usable data were received out of the 10,000 sent, while 684 
were undeliverable or non-applicable (e.g. farmer was deceased or retired), resulting in a 
response rate of approximately 25 percent. Due to missing data (either from questions not 
answered or entry of an implausible value), 1,716 survey were used for the analysis in this study.   
To complement the survey data, our analysis also draws upon data on soil characteristics 
at the county level from the Soil Survey Geographic (SSURGO) database (Soil Survey Staff, 
USDA-NRCS, 2010). Soils data used in this study include the kw-factor that examines soil 
erosion potential. County level averages for each soil variable were obtained for all 105 counties 
across the state of Kansas by taking spatially weighted averages across soil polygons using the 
percent of area of arable land represented by each soil polygon as the weighting factor. Soil 
variable values where then assigned to each respondent as the spatially weighted average of the 
associated county level averages or values using the percentage of their land operated in a given 
county as the weighting factor (Caldas et al., 2013).  
Summary statistics for explanatory (independent) variables derived from the survey, as 
well as the soil variable are provided in Table 1. Forty- one percent of survey respondents used 
Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE) in 2010 while sixty-three percent of survey 
respondents chose Revenue Assurance and/or Crop Revenue Coverage. Less than half of survey 
respondents described themselves as being a risk avoider. Fifty-three percent of survey 
respondents had a member of the household working off the farm, which was treated as 
“employment” in Dr. D’Souza’s adoption model (D’Souza et al., 1993). In general, off-farm 
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income can subsidize farm income in tough times and allow for additional investment 
opportunities on the farm. With such a “supplement”, farmers may be encouraged to undertake 
riskier crop rotations, influencing their adoption behavior.  
Bergtold and Molnar (2010) used a polychotomous-choice selectivity model to examine 
the factors affecting the adoption of different conservation practices by small and limited 
resource farmers in the Southeast. Based on what they found, the result indicated farm 
characteristics (e.g. size of farm operation, participation in Environmental Quality Incentives 
Program, raise livestock and rent acres) and farmer demographics and characteristics (e.g. 
college) affected conservation practice adoption. Other farmer demographics and characteristics 
(e.g. risk type, families employed off farm, experience and gender) will also play an important 
role on practice adoption decisions (Feder, 1980; D’Souza et al., 1993). Cooper and Keim (1996) 
and Cooper (2003) illustrated farmers were encourage to adopt environmentally sound 
management practices with the use of incentive government payment. To examine how crop 
rotations are affected by the use of insurance products, this study includes such characteristics of 
farming operations, farmer demographics and characteristics, landscape attributes, as well as 
marketing options and government payment.  
Summary statistics were compared to statistics in the 2007 Agricultural Census (USDA-
NASS, 2007). Survey respondents have been farming on average 36 years, while the 2007 
Agricultural Census (USDA-NASS, 2007) indicates the number of years that farmers have been 
farming their present farm is 26. This difference may be caused by the nature of designed 
questions. The survey asked total years farming, but the agricultural census asked the number of 
years working on their present farms. It shows that survey respondents do not only work on their 
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family farm but also other farms and off-farm. Means from 2007 Agricultural Census data 
(USDA-NASS, 2007) were computed at the state level for all farms with more than 50 acres of 
agricultural production. The average farm size reported from census is 863.01 acres while the 
average farm size of survey respondents is 1196.27 acres. Farms with more than 50 acres of crop 
land production and $ 10,000 in gross farm sales were surveyed, which eliminated a significant 
number of farms in Kansas. Finally, the 2007 Agricultural Census (USDA-NASS, 2007) 
indicates that 11 percent of farmers in Kansas are female. In contrast, only 5 percent of the 
survey respondents are female. This may be due to the fact that female farm operators may run 
smaller farms on average. 
            There were 13 crop rotation choices determined for dryland production in the survey as 
showed in Table 2. We did not model all possible rotations, but used crop rotations commonly 
identified by farm managers. Four of the rotations (continuous corn, continuous sorghum, corn-
sorghum and continuous soybean) were dropped, because they did not have sufficient 
observations to adequately estimate relationships. Table 2 indicates 17.78% of participants used 
a corn-soybeans-wheat rotation. The second largest group of participants used a wheat-sorghum-
fallow rotation. In contrast, a rotation of sorghum-soybean was only adopted by 2.66% of the 
respondents.   
1.4. Model  
            Let δm, m = 0, 1, …, M, be a specific crop rotation, where 𝛿𝑚 is a (r x 1) vector of 
indicator variables (Yr ) equal to 1 if the r
th  rotation is used. Under the assumption of utility 
maximization, a farmer i derives utility from choosing crop rotation m with a given set of 
attributes /factors Xi that maximizes utility umi. A utility framework was chosen because farmers 
may not be strictly motivated by factors related to profit maximization (Robinson et al., 1984; 
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Skaggs et al., 1994). Crop decisions may be a function of factors that impact both expected profit 
and other motives, which impacts a farmer’s utility (Chouinard et al., 2008). These factors may 
include farmer perceptions; age and other demographics; and employment (Barry and Baker, 
1977; Skaggs et al., 1994).  
The observed choice of rotation can be represented by a random utility model: 
    𝑢𝑚𝑖 = 𝑉𝑚 {𝐸 [𝑅(𝑋𝑖)]; 𝑍𝑖;  𝛽𝑚} + 𝜀𝑚𝑖,          (1)          
where 𝑉𝑚 is the deterministic component of utility, E[R] is the deterministic component of 
expected profit, 𝑋𝑖 is a set of individual specific explanatory variables affecting profit on 
practices, 𝑍𝑖  is a set of other variables that do not affect profit on practices, 𝛽𝑚 is a vector of 
parameters specific to bundle m, and  𝜀𝑖𝑚 is the random or unobserved component of utility 
(Louviere et al., 2000). It is assumed that 𝑉𝑚 is linear in 𝑋𝑖 and 𝑍𝑖 . A farmer will choose crop 
rotation m if:  
          𝑢𝑚𝑖 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑢1𝑖, … , 𝑢𝑚𝑖 , … , 𝑢𝑀𝑖)              (2) 
If the residuals, 𝜀𝑚𝑖, m = 0,1, …, M are independently distributed with extreme value 
distribution (type 1), then the probability of a farmer choosing 𝛿𝑚 can be written as: 
𝜋𝑚 = Pr(𝑇 = 𝑚) =
exp(𝑉𝑚 [𝐸 (𝑅(𝑋𝑖));𝑍𝑖; 𝛽𝑚)
∑ exp (𝑀𝑠=1 𝑉𝑠 [𝐸 (𝑅(𝑋𝑖)); 𝑍𝑖; 𝛽𝑠)
      (3) 
where T is a polychotomous index equal to m if crop rotation m is chosen. 
Following the methods in Bergtold and Molnar (2010) and Wu and Babcock (1998), a 
polychotomous-choice selectivity model of adoption is used following a multinomial logistic 
regression model. The adoption of these rotations is influenced by a number of explanatory 
factors, including experience, farm sales, farm size, land tenure, participation in conservation 
programs, farmer perceptions, different types of insurances, and a number of demographic 
variables.  
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As suggested by Wu (1999) and Hazell et al. (1986), the use of crop insurance products 
may impact the choice of crop, and in turn rotation, suggesting that the use of crop insurance 
products is endogenous. To correct for this, we assume that the use of crop insurance (an 
observed binary decision) is function of a number of explanatory factory, including: raising 
livestock, being risk averse, working off-farm, farm experience, land tenure arrangements, farm 
size, receipt of government payments, college, gender, farm sales, and use of marketing contracts 
(Wu, 1999). In addition, we incorporate the use of instruments for identification purpose and 
provide a strong instrumented regressor in the primary regression model. We utilize the variable 
“Assets” as an instrument as it is likely correlate with the use of insurance products (e.g. 
presence of debt increases the need for insurance products to be able to pay off the debt in years 
with low returns) (Sherrick et al., 2004), but independent of the choice of crop rotation. 
That is: 
𝐼𝑖
∗ = 𝛼′𝑊𝑖 +  𝑢𝑖 ,  𝐼𝑖 = {
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑠 𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 
,     (4) 
where I is the observed choice of using insurance products, 𝑊𝑖is a set of explanatory variables 
impacting the choice of purchasing insurance, and 𝑢𝑖 is an IID error term distribution extreme 
value type 1. The model represented by equation (4) can be estimated as a standard logistic 
regression model. Following Dalton et al. (2011), the predicted use of crop insurance products, 𝐼, 
is used as an instrumental variables in the multinomial model to control for endogeneity between 
use of crop insurance and choice of crop rotation.  
In this study, it is expected that use of insurance products can play a significant role in the 
decision-making process and further, we expect farm operators are encouraged by the application 
of insurance products.  
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Farm and famer characteristics should impact the choice of adoption as indicated by the 
literature reviews. In addition, government payment and market contract should also motivate 
farm operators as they make management decisions to maximize their profits. 
It is difficult to interpret the meaning of coefficients in the multinomial logistic model. 
The marginal effects of explanatory variables on the probability of choosing or adopting a crop 
provide a measure to assess the impact of specific explanatory factors. The marginal effects 
provide both a sign and magnitude for the marginal change of an explanatory variable on the 
probability of adoption. The marginal effects can be expressed as (Greene, 2012): 
     
𝜕𝜋𝑚
𝜕𝑋𝑘
= 𝜋𝑚[𝛽𝑚 − ∑ 𝜋𝑠𝛽𝑠
𝑀
𝑠=0 ]           (5)  
            It should be noted that the sign of the marginal effects may not follow the sign of 𝛽𝑚 for 
m = 0,1,…,M. Standard errors for all marginal effects are estimated using the delta method 
(Greene, 2012).     
1.5. Results and Discussion                 
            For this study, the multinomial model is estimated using NLOGIT 4.0 for all nine crop 
rotations with sorghum and soybean as the base. MATLAB is then used to estimate associated 
asymptotic standard errors. The McFadden Pseudo R-square for the regression is equal to 0.051 
for the instrumental insurance regression examining insurance use and 0.119 for the multinomial 
crop rotation model. Marginal effects of the explanatory variables are of more interest than 
coefficient estimates, especially for the multinomial model, given they examine the change in 
probability of choosing a crop rotation given a one unit or incremental change in the explanatory 
variables being examined. Parameter estimates, fit statistics, marginal effects and associated 
asymptotic statistics for the instrumental insurance regression are presented in Table 3. 
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Parameter estimates, fit statistics, marginal effects and associated asymptotic statistics for the 
crop rotation multinomial model are presented in Tables 4 and 5.    
1.5.1 Crop Insurance Product Usage  
            Farm size, government payment, farm operation sales and farmers’ assets financed with 
debt increased the probability of purchasing crop insurance. With more acres rented, larger farm 
size and more gross values in crop production, farm operators are more likely to seek and require 
crop insurance to protect their investment and income for the enterprise. Wu (1999) mentions 
that farmers treat agricultural crop insurance as a mechanism to protect future farm income as 
government commodity programs have been downsized. Thus, as farms increase in size and 
diversity, insurance helps to protect against larger risks from operating on more land and more 
crops. Farms that are more leveraged are more likely to require insurance to help reduce risk 
(Sherrick et al, 2004). Raising livestock, off-farm employment, farm experience and land rented 
decrease the likelihood of purchasing crop insurance. Farm operations are more heavily invested 
in livestock may use cropping operations as a major source of feed, reducing the need for crop 
insurance. Describing yourself as a risk-avoider, having a college degree, being a male farm 
operator and decisions influenced by market contract did not play a significant role in 
determining the likelihood of purchasing crop insurance. Sherrick et al. (2004) found that larger 
farm size and more land rented increased the probability of purchasing crop insurance by farmers 
in Illinois, Indiana and Iowa. In addition, they also found risk perceptions, risk management 
scores and more highly leveraged farms increased the likelihood of using crop insurance, but 
nothing to do with raising livestock. Interestingly, they stated that farmers preferred revenue 
insurance to yield insurance when they have a larger farm size.     
1.5.2 Crop Rotation Choice 
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Examining the marginal effects of different explanatory factors on the choice of crop 
rotations shows that different factors impact different crop rotation decisions.  
Sorghum-Soybean (R-S): Describing yourself as a risk-avoider and government payment 
increased the likelihood of adopting a sorghum-soybean rotation by 4.6% and 0.1%, respectively. 
Being a male farm operator, participation in EQIP and/ or CSP, receiving government payment 
from no tillage and higher risk of soil erosion decreased the likelihood of adopting a sorghum-
soybean rotation. The purchase of crop insurance did not affect the likelihood of choosing a 
sorghum-soybean rotation.   
Corn-Soybean (C-S): Being a male farm operator, farm operation sales, receiving government 
payment from no-tillage and higher risk of soil erosion increased the likelihood of using a corn-
soybean rotation. Farm size, government payment and possibility of extremely dry periods 
reduced the probability of choosing corn-soybean rotation. Given the water requirements for 
corn production, the possibility of a drought decreased the likelihood of using this rotation by 
5.8% at a one percent level of significance. Given that much of corn and soybeans is grown 
using no tillage and corn is a heavy residue crop (Canales, 2016), farmers’ wanting to reduce soil 
erosion would likely choose this type of rotation to protect the soil. Given the strong agricultural 
markets in the year of the survey, farmers seeking government agricultural payments via crop 
production would not likely have adopted this or similar crop rotations.   
Corn-Soybeans-Wheat (C-S-W): Participation in EQIP and/ or CSP, receiving government 
payment from no-tillage and higher risk of soil erosion increased the likelihood of adopting corn-
soybean-wheat rotation. Government payment reduced the likelihood of adopting this rotation by 
0.4% at a 5 percent level of significance. Similar to the adoption of corn-soybean, farmers 
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seeking government agricultural payments via cop production would not likely have adopted this 
crop rotation.  
Continuous Wheat (W-W): Describing yourself as a risk-avoider and use of market contract 
increased the likelihood of adopting a continuous wheat rotation by 5.0% and 4.0%, respectively.  
Farm experience, farm operation sales, participation in EQIP and/ or CSP, receiving government 
payment from no-tillage, higher risk of soil erosion and possibility of extremely dry periods 
lowered the probability of choosing continuous wheat rotation.  Much of the wheat in Kansas is 
managed using some form of tillage operation (Canales, 2016). Thus farmers who practice no-
tillage and/or have more degraded lands are less likely to grow rotations with wheat. Risk averse 
farmers may decide to grow this rotation (or wheat-fallow) out of familiarity and the certainty it 
provides based on historical experience.   
Wheat-Fallow (W-F): Describing yourself as a risk-avoider and government payment increased 
the likelihood of adopting a wheat-fallow rotation by 4.6% and 0.1%, respectively. Being a male 
farm operator, participation in EQIP and/ or CSP, receiving government payment from no-tillage 
and higher risk of soil erosion reduced the likelihood of using a wheat-fallow rotation.   
Wheat-Sorghum-Fallow (W-R-F): Farm size, government payment, receiving government 
payment from no-tillage and possibility of extremely dry periods increased the likelihood of 
choosing a wheat-sorghum-fallow rotation. Sorghum is a drought-resistant crop. Thus, periods of 
dryer weather would likely increase the use of dryland rotations with this crop, by 4.1% in this 
study. Use of market contract, farm operation sales and higher risk of soil erosion lowered the 
likelihood of adopting wheat-sorghum-fallow rotation. Again, wheat is usually managed using 
some form of tillage operation. On the other hand, sorghum and corn are managed predominately 
with no-tillage. That is, tillage practices tend to be crop specific (Canales, 2016).  
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Wheat-Corn-Fallow (W-C-F): Government payment and receiving government payment from 
no-tillage increased the likelihood of adopting wheat-corn-fallow rotation by 0.1% and 4.5%, 
respectively. Higher risk of soil erosion lowered the likelihood of adopting wheat-corn-fallow by 
21.7% at a one percent level of significance.   
Wheat-Soybean (W-S): A Higher risk of soil erosion increased the likelihood of adopting a 
wheat-soybean rotation by 26.2%, while having a college degree decreased the probability of 
choosing this rotation by 2.9%.   
Wheat-Soybean-Sorghum (W-S-R): Having a college degree, receiving government payment 
from no-tillage and possibility of extremely dry periods increased the likelihood of adopting 
wheat-soybean-sorghum by 1.9%, 2.3% and 3.0%, respectively. 
Farmers with more years of experience may not be willing to adopt an unfamiliar risky 
crop rotation (Pannell et al., 2006). In this study, similarly, farmers with more farm experience 
were 0.2% less likely to adopt continuous wheat rotation.  Landscape variables (KW Factor) and 
no-tillage variable were significant for many crop rotations. These two factors are likely to 
partially drive the choice of crop mix. It is important to note the risk aversion defines farmers’ 
tendency to avoid risks in their decision-making and empirical evidences show that farmers vary 
in their personal degree of risk aversion (Marra et al., 2003; Pannell et al., 2006). In this study, 
risk-averse farmers are more willing to adopt sorghum-soybean, continuous wheat and wheat-
fallow rotations. We expect risk aversion factor has impact on choices of every rotation, but its 
power may be dampened by use of insurance products (e.g. ACRE, RA_CRC).  
1.6. Conclusion  
To understand factors affecting choices on crop rotations, a multinomial logit model was 
developed to examine how choice of crop rotations would be affected by the use of various 
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insurance products, which include Revenue Assurance/Crop Revenue Coverage and Average 
Crop Revenue Election, as well as marketing options and characteristics of the farming 
operations. The multinomial framework was then used to estimate the marginal effects of these 
different factors on the probability of choosing different crop rotations. As found in this study, 
the presence of insurance had no direct impact on the choice of selected crop rotation in this 
paper. This may due to the fact of high crop prices during the time the survey was conducted, 
potentially reduced the effect of insurance on crop rotation choice. In addition, all the crops 
investigated were primary commodity crops that have insurance available, which may lessen the 
impact of crop insurance on choice of crop rotation. On the other hand, it may be that use of crop 
insurance is crop specific as found in studies examined in the literature review and not impacted 
by rotation of crops. This could be due to the fact that crop insurance can be purchased annually 
and requires a history of using the crop on-farm (i.e. that you have historical yields). 
Wu (1999) indicates that crop rotations are usually treated as a means of risk 
management to help mitigate risk. Farmers that use crop rotations may be more risk averse 
(Fuglie and Bosch, 1995) and more likely to purchase crop insurance (Wu, 1999). Finding here 
would suggest that risk aversion does impact choice of crop rotation, but famers who identified 
themselves as a risk avoider were just as likely to purchase crop insurance as other farmers 
surveyed. It is not clear from the results in this study that crop insurance has an appreciably 
significant impact on choice of crop rotation, but in fact the choice of purchasing crop insurance 
may be impacted by choice of crop in rotation, as suggested by Wu (1999). This is an area for 
future study.  
The estimated marginal effects from both crop rotation and crop insurance usage provide 
statistical information that may help identify and distinguish how farm and farmer 
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characteristics, government payment and market options, and especially insurance products, 
affect the choice of crop rotations in dryland cropping systems. This study shows the increasing 
probabilities of using crop insurance as farm size, government payment, farm operation sales and 
farmers’ assets financed with debt went up. But, in contrast, raising livestock, off-farm 
employment, farm experience and land rented decreased the likelihood of purchasing crop 
insurance.  
Crop insurance has been playing an increasingly significant role as an instrument of the 
agricultural policy and agricultural conservation practices. Federal crop insurance programs may 
require conservation components, which may include crop rotations. 
            Findings from this study suggest that purchase of crop insurance does not significantly 
drive the choice of crop rotations. If more conservation oriented crop rotation is a goal of federal 
programs, then mandating them for purchase of deferral crop insurance products may not be an 
effective policy tool, which may translate to other conservation practices too.  It may be that use 
of deferral conservation programs (e.g. EQIP) and promotion of conservation practices (e.g. no 
tillage) may be a better route for promoting crop rotation practices that will help to reach federal 
conservation goals.    
             A number of limitations in this study do exist though. Farmer’s assets financed with debt 
could be a potentially weak instrumental variable and other potential instruments need to be 
explored. Farmers’ insurance decision was specified as a dichotomous choice and the data does 
not include information on coverage level or for what crop insurance was purchased. A more 
well-defined crop insurance variable that is crop specific that possibly includes coverage levels 
could lead to more insightful findings in the future. The choice of tillage practice may be 
endogenous with choice of crop rotation, but this was not modeled here (as choice of tillage was 
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based on receipt of an incentive payment) and should be explored more in the future. An 
unexpected result that necessitates deeper exploration is why being a risk avoider was 
insignificant in the insurance regression, when this would be expected to be significantly 
positive. Furthermore, the study could go deeper by exploring specific hypotheses rather than a 
more correlation based analysis. For future research, the joint probabilities of adopting two or 
more crops can be studied and developed to capture the dependence between adopting different 
crop choices based on various insurance products. Moreover, the framework could be built 
expanded to examine the sequential adoption of crops over time and the impact of various 
insurance products.    
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Table 1.1. Definition of Variables (N = 1716 ) 
Variables Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Definition 
Landscape Variables 
KW Factor 0.30 0.10 Spatially weighted average K-W factor in the counties farmers operate 
Climatic Variables 
Possibility 
Dry period 
0.31 0.46 
Planting decisions by the farm operator are influenced by the possibility of extremely dry periods in 
2010 (1= yes, 0 =no)  
Farmer Characteristics 
Experience 35.85 15.04 Number of years the operator has been farming 
College 0.34 0.47 Farm operator has earned a college degree (1 = yes, 0 = no) 
Gender 0.95 0.23 Gender of farm operator (1 = male, 0 = female) 
Off-Farm Employ 0.53 0.50 Farmers or their immediate families employed off the farm (1 = yes, 0 = no) 
Risk Avoider 0.40 0.49 Farmer describes themselves as a risk avoider (1 = yes, 0 = no) 
Farm Characteristics 
Insurance 0.67 0.47 Use and purchase of ACRE or RA-CRC crop insurance product (1 = yes, 0 = no) 
Farm Size 1166.41 6699.15 Total cropland acres operated in 2010 
Livestock 0.52 0.50 Cattle and/or hogs raised on farmers' operation in 2010 (1 = yes, 0 = no) 
Gross Value 284161.30 415483.90 Total value of sales from farm operations ($) 
Market Contract 0.22 0.41 Farmers' planting decisions are influenced by marketing contracts (1 = yes, 0 = no)  
Rent Acres 0.43 0.37 Percent of total acres rented 
Government 
Payment 
5.61 8.14 Percent of the total gross value of sales from the operation in 2010 was from government payments 
Variability 
Crop Prices 
0.33 0.47 Planting decisions were influenced by changes in crop prices in 2010  
EQIP and CSP 0.12 0.32 
Farmer participates in Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) and/or Conservation  
Security/Stewardship Program (CSP) in 2010 (1 = yes, 0 = no) 
Assets 17.80 22.47 Percentage of a farmer’s assets from the operation financed with debt in 2010  
No Tillage 0.69 0.46 Receive any government conservation payments for no-tillage/conservation tillage (1=yes,0=no) 
Standard deviations are provided for continuous variables, but not for binary variables, as they are function of the mean. Thus, the standard deviation of all  
binary variables is calculated as:√(p(1-p)), where p is the mean of the binary variable. 
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Table 1.2. Summary of Crop Rotations 
Crop Rotations Corn Sorghum Soybean Wheat Percentage of Obs. 
C-C continuous corn X - - - 0.52% 
C-S corn-soybeans X - X - 14.69% 
C-S-W corn-soybeans-wheat X - X X 17.78% 
R-R continuous sorghum X X - - 0.62% 
R-S sorghum-soybean - X X - 2.66% 
W-W continuous wheat - - - X 9.65% 
W-F wheat-fallow - - - X 11.70% 
W-R-F wheat-sorghum-fallow - X - X 17.21% 
W-C-F wheat-corn-fallow X - - X 6.28% 
C-R corn-sorghum X X - - 0.10% 
W-S wheat-soybean - - X X 10.32% 
W-S-R wheat-soybean-sorghum - X X X 4.56% 
S-S continuous soybean  - - X - 1.09% 
N/A all the other rotations left - - - - 2.82% 
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Table 1.3. Parameter Estimates, Fit Statistics and Marginal Effects for the Insurance Adoption Model 
insurance Coefficient Marginal Effects 
Livestock 
-0.857*** -0.182*** 
(0.111) (0.023) 
Risk Avoider 
-0.015 -0.003 
(0.109) (0.023) 
Off-Farm  
Employ 
-0.197* -0.043* 
(0.115) (0.025) 
Experience 
-0.010*** -0.002*** 
(0.004) (0.001) 
Rent Acres 
-1.932e-4** -4.170e-5** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Farm Size 
1.857e-4** 4.010e-5** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Government  
Payment 
0.011** 0.002** 
(0.005) (0.001) 
College 
-0.090 -0.019 
(0.114) (0.025) 
Gender 
-0.331 -0.067 
(0.288) (0.055) 
Market 
Contract 
0.148 0.031 
(0.136) (0.028) 
Gross  
Value 
5.830e-7*** 1.260e-7*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Assets 
0.005** 0.001** 
(0.003) (0.001) 
Constant 
1.617*** N/A 
(0.348) N/A 
Fit Statistics 
Log Likelihood -1031.606 
Likelihood Ratio Test Statistic 110.050 
McFaddden Psuedo R2 0.051 
Number of Observations               1716 
1. Asympotic standard errors are presented in parentheses;  
2. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 1.4. Parameter Estimates and Fit Statistics for the Multinomial Logit Model of Crop Rotations 
Variables 
Crop Rotations 
C-S C-S-W W-W W-F W-R-F W-C-F W-S W-S-R 
Insurance 
7.300** 6.992** 4.700 9.587*** 9.447*** 10.805** 3.172 9.895** 
(3.581) (3.377) (4.227) (3.793) (3.423) (4.390) (4.068) (4.953) 
Livestock 
1.016 0.893 0.496 0.978 1.333** 0.936 -0.005 1.174 
(0.665) (0.620) (0.785) (0.692) (0.627) (0.769) (0.758) (0.907) 
Risk 
Avoider 
0.306 0.260 1.042*** 0.942*** 0.508*** 0.510* 0.330 0.147 
(0.207) (0.197) (0.224) (0.215) (0.197) (0.267) (0.218) (0.288) 
Off-Farm 
Employ 
0.536** 0.229 0.209 0.422 0.379 0.201 0.209 0.691** 
(0.252) (0.237) (0.281) (0.262) (0.238) (0.305) (0.273) (0.343) 
Experience 
0.026** 0.021** -0.002 0.026** 0.019* 0.026** 0.016 0.018 
(0.011) (0.010) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) 
Rent Acres 
0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 6.034e-4*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Farm Size 
-0.001*** -4.964e-4*** 3.566e-4 -2.097e-4 -1.661e-4 -2.133e-4 -0.001*** -4.737e-4* 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Government 
Payment 
-0.138*** -0.089*** -0.037*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.034** -0.056*** -0.084*** 
(0.022) (0.017) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.017) (0.026) 
College 
-0.129 -0.173 0.085 0.135 -0.014 0.146 -0.348 0.374 
(0.224) (0.212) (0.246) (0.235) (0.212) (0.275) (0.245) (0.302) 
Gender 
1.711** 0.678 1.653** -0.359 0.249 1.148 0.333 0.733 
(0.702) (0.508) (0.813) (0.446) (0.463) (0.818) (0.551) (0.733) 
Market 
Contract 
-0.334 -0.296 0.311 0.134 -0.517* -0.141 -0.237 -0.437 
(0.294) (0.273) (0.319) (0.298) (0.280) (0.347) (0.318) (0.396) 
Gross 
Value 
4.840e-7 1.140e-8 -1.540e-6** -6.660e-7 -1.270e-6** -2.370e-7 -2.290e-8 -1.180e-6 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
EQIP 
and CSP 
-0.125 0.058 -0.979** -0.798** -0.181 -0.421 -0.398 -0.451 
(0.292) (0.266) (0.422) (0.369) (0.276) (0.369) (0.337) (0.435) 
No 
Tillage 
0.936*** 1.310*** -0.248 -0.362 0.979*** 1.534*** 0.533** 1.223*** 
(0.216) (0.214) (0.229) (0.222) (0.210) (0.343) (0.223) (0.332) 
KW Factor 
9.704*** 5.144*** -1.399 -5.706*** -5.183*** -3.792*** 4.344** 0.321 
(2.215) (1.562) (1.138) (0.950) (0.906) (1.162) (1.731) (1.616) 
Variability 
Crop Prices 
0.152 0.249 -0.055 -0.039 0.102 0.033 0.106 -0.179 
(0.224) (0.211) (0.252) (0.242) (0.216) (0.287) (0.240) (0.313) 
Possibility 
Dry Period 
-0.560** -0.126 -0.404 0.109 0.233 -0.115 -0.141 0.599** 
(0.239) (0.216) (0.261) (0.238) (0.213) (0.289) (0.246) (0.293) 
Constant 
-10.918*** -8.356*** -4.779 -6.265* -6.954** -10.888*** -4.472 -10.360** 
(3.267) (2.984) (3.710) (3.252) (2.954) (3.807) (3.574) (4.342) 
Fit Statistics 
Log likelihood  -3212.503 
Likelihood Ratio Test Statistic 867.610 
McFaddden Psuedo R2 0.119 
Number of Observations               1716 
Note: CS-corn-soybean, CSW-corn-soybean-wheat, WW-continuous wheat, WF-wheat-fallow, WRF-wheat-sorghum-fallow, 
WCF-wheat-corn-fallow, WS-wheat-soybean, WSR-wheat-soybean-sorghum. Asymptotic standard errors are presented in 
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 1.5. Marginal Effects for the Multinomial Logit Model of Crop Rotation 
Variables 
Crop Rotations 
R-S C-S C-S-W W-W W-F W-R-F W-C-F W-S W-S-R 
Insurance 
0.296 0.132 0.077 -0.135 0.296 0.379 0.204 -0.302 0.145 
(0.253) (0.287) (0.307) (0.261) (0.253) (0.299) (0.186) (0.280) (0.182) 
Livestock 
0.021 0.037 0.021 -0.019 0.021 0.080 0.005 -0.071 0.018 
(0.046) (0.053) (0.056) (0.049) (0.046) (0.054) (0.032) (0.052) (0.033) 
Risk 
Avoider 
0.046*** -0.010 -0.021 0.050*** 0.046*** 0.007 0.004 -0.008 -0.012 
(0.014) (0.017) (0.018) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) 
Off-Farm 
Employ 
0.013 0.031 -0.013 -0.007 0.013 0.011 -0.006 -0.009 0.017 
(0.017) (0.020) (0.022) (0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.013) (0.018) (0.013) 
Experience 
0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.002* 0.001 3.482e-4 4.634e-4 -7.060e-5 5.090e-5 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Rent Acres 
-1.690e-5 3.160e-5 3.340e-6 2.270e-5 -1.690e-5 1.350e-5 5.060e-6 3.040e-5 1.030e-5 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Farm Size 
1.250e-5 -6.940e-5*** -5.640e-6 2.830e-6 1.250e-5 2.950e-5** 9.140e-6 -2.660e-5 -2.220e-6 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Government 
Payment 
0.001** -0.009*** -0.004** 0.001 0.001* 0.003*** 0.001** 0.001 -0.001 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
College 
0.014 -0.008 -0.019 0.010 0.014 -2.480e-4 0.009 -0.029* 0.019* 
(0.016) (0.019) (0.020) (0.015) (0.016) (0.019) (0.012) (0.017) (0.011) 
Gender 
-0.088*** 0.130* -0.007 0.089 -0.088*** -0.048 0.031 -0.035 0.003 
(0.029) (0.068) (0.054) (0.057) (0.029) (0.044) (0.039) (0.040) (0.028) 
Market  
Contract 
0.029 -0.017 -0.013 0.040** 0.029 -0.050** 0.005 -0.005 -0.010 
(0.020) (0.024) (0.025) (0.019) (0.020) (0.025) (0.014) (0.022) (0.014) 
Gross 
Value 
-1.110e-8 1.030e-7*** 5.290e-8 -9.210e-8* -1.110e-8 -1.170e-7*** 1.410e-8 3.140e-8 -3.510e-8 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
EQIP and 
CSP 
-0.045* 0.016 0.050** -0.055* -0.045* 0.021 -0.008 -0.012 -0.008 
(0.027) (0.024) (0.025) (0.029) (0.027) (0.025) (0.016) (0.024) (0.017) 
No Tillage 
-0.089*** 0.028* 0.093*** -0.067*** -0.089*** 0.052*** 0.045*** -0.012 0.023* 
(0.014) (0.018) (0.021) (0.014) (0.014) (0.019) (0.016) (0.015) (0.012) 
KW Factor 
-0.512*** 0.993*** 0.528*** -0.163*** -0.512*** -0.762*** -0.217*** 0.262** -0.038 
(0.055) (0.221) (0.176) (0.065) (0.055) (0.073) (0.045) (0.132) (0.057) 
Variability 
Crop Prices 
-0.009 0.008 0.026 -0.010 -0.009 0.006 -0.002 0.002 -0.012 
(0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.015) (0.016) (0.019) (0.012) (0.016) (0.012) 
Possibility 
Dry Period 
0.015 -0.058*** -0.003 -0.028* 0.015 0.041** -0.004 -0.003 0.030*** 
(0.016) (0.020) (0.020) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.012) (0.017) (0.011) 
Note: RS-sorghum-soybean, CS-corn-soybean, CSW-corn-soybean-wheat, WW-continuous wheat, WF-wheat-fallow, WRF-wheat-sorghum-fallow, WCF-wheat-corn-fallow, WS-wheat-
soybean, WSR-wheat-soybean-sorghum. Asymptotic standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Chapter 2 - Assessing the Joint and Conditional Adoption of Soil 
Conservation Practices of Kansas Farm Managers 
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2.1. Introduction 
Conservation systems are able to improve both direct and indirect ecosystem services 
(Reicosky, 2008). Direct services are improved by farmers’ working on agricultural lands, such 
as providing food and feedstock supplies. Indirect services are enhanced by using conservation 
systems in existing production systems, which can help to enhance life-fulfilling services (e.g. 
existence value and scientific discovery), stabilizing services (e.g. partial stabilization of climate 
and moderation of weather extremes), and preservation of options (e.g. maintenance of 
ecological components and systems needed for the future) (Chee, 2004). Tilman et al. (2002) 
found that agricultural systems that do not enhance indirect ecosystem services can degrade soil 
quality, result in higher soil erosion rates, and potentially require increased input use (e.g. 
fertilization, irrigation and energy) to offset declining soil productivity. In contrast, well 
managed agricultural systems that enhance indirect ecosystem services through conservation can 
help to reduce soil erosion and improve soil quality, as well as improve crop yield and lower 
crop yield variability (Hanson et al., 2007; Reicosky, 2008).  
Agricultural conservation systems consist of a myriad of conservation practices, 
including conservation tillage, dynamic crop rotations, cover crops, use of legumes in rotation, 
use of manure, precision agriculture, integrated pest management, and conservation nutrient 
management practices. The applied economics literature has studied a large number of factors 
affecting the adoption of these conservation practices. Many studies have examined the adoption 
of single practices (e.g. Helms et al., 1987; Fuglie and Bosch, 1995; Hamido and Kpomblekou-
A, 2009), while only a few others have examined the joint adoption of a set of conservation 
practices or bundles (e.g. Wu and Babcock, 1998; Bergtold and Molnar, 2010). A limited 
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number of studies have examined the step-wise or sequential adoption of conservation practices 
(e.g. Byerlee and Polanco, 1986; Leather and Smale, 1991).    
  Farmers can benefit from the mix and intensity of conservation practices adopted. 
Conservation practices affect the entire production system on-farm, and their interactions within 
the production system have an impact on soil and water conservations. Pierce (1985) founded 
that conservation tillage affected almost the whole crop production system, including crop 
rotations, planting, equipment performance and so on. As a result, in order to take advantage of 
conservation practices, farmers must be able to make decisions taking into account the 
interrelated nature of conservation practices and other agricultural practices. In addition, farmers 
need to identify the set of local resource concerns (e.g. soil condition, water condition, air 
condition, plants or animals) and the corresponding set of conservation practices (e.g. time, 
location and adoption) for a properly and well-developed conservation plan. Stinner and House 
(1989) emphasize that famers must use a system approach by collecting all the interrelated 
factors together when addressing conservation needs. The social and economic factors that affect 
the adoption of conservation practices should also be taken into account with conservation plans. 
Pannell et al. (2006) reviewed a large number of these factors, including farm demographics, 
farm characteristics, cultural barriers, social networks, farmers’ personalities, risk perceptions, 
economic well-being, land tenure and other socio-economic factors that drive conservation 
practice adoption.    
The purpose of this study is to examine and analyze the adoption of conservation 
practices by farmers in Kansas from both a joint and conditional perspective. The study 
examines farmers’ joint and conditional decision to adopt alternative conservation bundles and 
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the socio-economic and farm factors affecting adoption of individual and bundles of 
conservation practices. To the authors’ knowledge the examination of the joint and conditional 
adoption using cross-sectional data as explored in this paper has not been examined in the 
agricultural economics literature to date. Thus, the paper provides a novel contribution to the 
methodology of examining adoption of new technologies. The conservation practices considered 
here will be the use of conservation tillage, cover crops and crediting of nutrients from manure. 
            The joint adoption (adopting multiple conservation practices during specified time 
period) of a bundle or system of conservation practices is modeled using a multinomial logistic 
framework under a random utility approach. The model is then used to estimate conditional 
probabilities of adopting conservation practices given the adoption of other practices. These 
estimates will allow for an assessment of the linkages between the adoption of different 
conservation practices, as well as the socio-economic factors that affect the likelihood of 
adopting such conservation practices given other conservation practices have already been 
adopted (e.g. examine potential step-wise adoption). Farmers may improve on-farm performance 
of conservation cropping systems through increasing the efficiency of the conservation practices 
adopted, as well as reducing risk and uncertainty given the useful and valuable background 
information with past choices. To the authors’ knowledge, this approach has not been thoroughly 
explored in the applied economics literature.    
2.2. Background 
2.2.1 Cross-Sectional Methods Used in the Adoption Literature  
            Many studies examine the adoption of single practices. Gould et al. (1989) used a single 
probit equation and two-limit tobit model to examine factors influencing producers’ level of 
awareness of soil erosion; and found that farmers who worked off-farm had a lower probability 
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of adopting conservation tillage because of a lack of information or commitment to the farm 
operation. Fuglie and Bosch (1995) employed a simultaneous equation model to study the impact 
of soil nitrogen testing and illustrated that lower farm sales showed a lower probability to adopt 
soil nitrogen tests. Uri (1997) used a two-stage decision model to estimate corn produced in the 
United States in 1987 with Farm Costs and Returns Survey (FCRS) and found that cash grain 
enterprises preferred to choosing conservation tillage than other types of farms. Soule et al. 
(2000) used a logistic adoption model with data from 941 U.S. corn producers to study how land 
tenure affected conservation practice adoption and found that types of lease arrangement would 
influence the adoption of conservation tillage.  
Others have examined the joint adoption of a set of conservation practices. Wu and 
Babcock (1998) applied a polychotomous-choice model to the choice of alternative management 
practices, conservation tillage, rotation and soil N testing, on cropland and stated that farmers 
were more likely to perform conservation practices when they had a conservation plan, but not 
for small and limited-resource famers. Bergtold and Molnar (2010) used a polychotomous-choice 
selectivity model to examine factors affecting the adoption of conservation tillage, soil testing 
and crop rotations by small and limited resource farmers in the southeastern U.S. They found 
that these farmers had limited adoption of the selected practices and that farmers adopted 
practices individually rather in bundles. In addition, they found these adoption patterns would 
affect the eligibility of small and limited-resource farmers’ eligibility for the Conservation 
Security Program (CSP).   
Studies have examined the step-wise or sequential adoption of conservation practices. 
Byerlee and Polanco (1986) found that farmers preferred to adopt practices with the highest 
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returns the earliest and also showed that conservation system adoption is a dynamic and ongoing 
process. Leather and Smale (1991) pointed out that the simultaneous adoption of bundles of 
conservation practices would be the most profitable long-term approach, but step-wise adoption 
might be the least cost option. Khanna (2001) used a bivariate probit model to analyze the 
sequential decision to adopt soil testing followed by variable rate technology to study the effect 
of adoption on nitrogen productivity.   
            This study builds on this literature by considering a methodological framework to expand 
on the methods examining the adoption of conservation practices (and technologies) using cross-
sectional data. A multinomial modeling framework under a random utility approach is used to 
model the joint adoption of conservation practices. The framework is then used to estimate 
conditional probabilities of adopting conservation practices from the joint adoption model, which 
has not been thoroughly explored in the applied economics literature. To model this, we focus on 
the adoption of three conservation practices by crop farmers in Kansas:  no tillage, cover crops 
and credit nutrients from manure as a fertilizer source. 
2.2.2 Conservation Practices 
No-Till: No-tillage (no-till), also called zero tillage or direct drilling, is a method used to plant or 
grow crops or pasture from year to year without influencing the soil through tillage (USDA-
NRCS, 2013). No-tillage is planting crops into untilled soil by opening a proper slot with 
sufficient width and depth to obtain seed coverage (Derpsch and Friedrich, 2009). No-tillage is 
an agricultural technique that is used to eliminate soil erosion by increasing water and organic 
matter retention, as well as cycling of nutrients in the soil. Another significant benefit of no-
tillage is improvement in soil biological fertility, which makes soil more resilient (USDA-NRCS, 
2013). Lal (1976) mentioned that no-tillage results in higher organic matter content and higher 
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concentrations of nitrate-nitrogen under several crop rotations (e.g. maize-cowpeas and 
soybeans-soybeans), while runoff and erosion losses from use of no-tillage were minimal. Seta et 
al. (1993) conducted a study evaluating the effects of conventional tillage, chisel-plow tillage 
and no-tillage on the quality of runoff water near Lexington, KY. They found that no-tillage had 
the lowest mean runoff tare, total runoff volume, mean sediment concentration and total soil 
losses. Moreover, NO−3, NH
+
3, and PO
3−
4 in the runoff water from no-tillage were higher than 
the other two practices examined. Tillage practices can have an impact on farm income, 
commodity production, and markets. There was a large increase in no-till adoption in the U.S. 
from 38.9 million acres in 1994 to 62.4 million acres by 2004 (Horowitz et al., 2010).   
Cover crops: Cover crops are crops planted primarily to manage soil fertility, soil quality, water, 
weeds and biodiversity in an agroecosystem (Lu et al., 2000). Cover crops are defined as crops 
grown specifically for covering ground to avoid or eliminate soil erosion and loss of plant 
nutrients through leaching and runoff (Pieters and McKee, 1938).  Elwell and Stocking (1976) 
presented evidence showing that percent vegetal cover was the primary element determining 
erosion hazard from crops and grassland in Rhodesia. Everts et al. (2002) found that hairy vetch 
and hairy vetch and rye cover crop mixtures increased fruit harvest numbers when compared to 
crop production on bare ground. In addition, cover crops may help to break disease cycles and 
reduce populations of bacterial and fungal diseases. Cover crops can also contribute to increasing 
availability of nitrogen to succeeding crops, improve soil structure and water infiltration, reduce 
surface soil temperature and water evaporation, and increase soil productivity (Frye et al., 1988) 
Singer et al. (2011) employed a root zone water quality model to analyze the effect of cover crop 
on nitrogen load in tile drainage in Iowa, and they found that the winter annual cover crop could  
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reduce annual N loads to tile drains by approximately 20% in either 2-year or 3-year maize-
soybean and maize-maize-soybean rotation.  
Credit nutrients from manure (Manure Practice): Manure can be obtained from dairy, swine, 
chicken, turkey, and poultry and so on. Nutrients from the manure can be used to replace 
fertilizer, as well as for crop year and rotation. Manure is used as fertilizer on agricultural lands 
to contribute to the fertility of the soil by adding organic matter and nutrients that are trapped by 
bacteria in the soil. Green manure has been barely used recently as its high cost and uncertain 
yearly performance. However, Westcott and Mikkelsen (1988) found leguminous green manure 
crops can provide one third to a half of the N required for high-yielding rice varieties. Fronning 
et al. (2008) conducted a field experiment under a corn-soybean rotation with complete corn 
stover removal and found use of manure raised soil C level in the 0 to 5 and 0 to 25 cm soil 
profile and total soil organic C in the 0 to 25 cm profile by 25%. The frequency of chicken 
manure rates altered vegetative growth characteristics of apple trees significantly (Kakehzadeh et 
al., 2014). Manure was also found to significantly increase growth and yield parameters, as well 
as the final yields of vegetable maize (Amos et al., 2013). As a conservation practice, the use of 
manure should reduce the use of commercial fertilizers on-farm. That is, the nutrients obtained 
from the manure should be credited and use of commercial fertilizer reduced accordingly. 
2.3. Data  
The data used for this paper was obtained from a mail survey in 2011 examining Kansas 
farmers’ land use decisions. The survey contained questions about how farmers make their land-
use decision on a wide array of topics. The survey asked respondents to address their goals in 
farming; participation in conservation programs; use of irrigation; willingness to grow biofuel 
crops; perceptions related to price, yield, and weather risk; usage of insurance and marketing 
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options; and characteristics of the farming operations. A primary goal of the survey was to assess 
the effects of alternative conservation practice and crop choices on farmers’ land-use decisions in 
Kansas. The survey consisted of an eight-page survey with 46 questions, leading to more than 
400 distinct variables in the survey dataset. 
 The survey targeted Kansas farmers with 50 or more acres of arable land and over 
$10,000 in gross farm annual income in 2010 to leave out lobby farmers and part-time producers. 
Names and addresses were obtained for approximately 23,000 farms meeting these criteria from 
a private vendor, FarmMarketID (a marketing technology company, www.FarmMarketID.com). 
For the full mailing of the survey, a random sample of 10,000 farmers was drawn from the 
FarmMarketID database, and then sent to respondents following the approach suggested by 
Dillman (2007) in late February 2011. A cover letter explaining the purpose of the survey, the 
composition of the research team, how the survey results would be utilized, and how we would 
safeguard individual survey responses was included, as well.  
A total of 2317 surveys with usable data were received out of the 10,000 sent, while 684 
were returned as undeliverable or where non-applicable (e.g. farmer was deceased or retired), 
resulting in a response rate of approximately 25 percent. Due to missing data (either from 
questions not answered or entry of an implausible value), 2163 survey were usable for the 
analysis in this study.   
To complement the survey data, our analysis also draws upon public available data on 
soil characteristics at the county level. Soils data were obtained from the Soil Survey Geographic 
(SSURGO) database (Soil Survey Staff, USDA-NRCS, 2010). Soils data used in this study 
included the kw-factor, which examines soil erosion potential; available water content for each 
 48 
 
soil polygon or unique area of arable land within a county (defined as land under land capability 
classes 1 to 6); and the standard deviation of slope – as a proxy of the variability of the terrain 
used for agriculture. County level averages for each soil variable were obtained for all 105 
counties across the state of Kansas by taking spatially weighted averages across soil polygons 
using the percent of area of arable land represented by each soil polygon as the weighting factor.  
Palmer Z, index was used as a weather variable, measures short term drought on a 
monthly basis and is more suitable for agricultural purpose (NOAA-NCDC, 2012; Karl 1986). 
Both the mean and standard deviation over a 10-year period for each county in Kansas were 
calculated. Soil variables and Palmer Z variables values where then assigned to each respondent 
as the spatially weighted average of the associated county level averages or values using the 
percentage of their land operated in a given county as the weighting factor (Caldas et al., 2013).   
            Summary statistics for explanatory (independent) variables derived from the survey, as 
well as the soil and weather variables are shown in Table 1. The table contains five categories of 
variables that are considered in the joint adoption model examined: landscape attributes, farm 
characteristics, farmer demographics and characteristics, region and weather. Fifty-two percent 
of survey respondent raised either cattle or hog or both on farmers’ operation in 2010. And 
twelve percent of farmers in the survey enrolled in Environmental Quality Incentives Program 
(EQIP) and/or Conservation Security/Stewardship Program (CSP), while less than half of survey 
respondents described themselves as being a risk-avoider. Fifty-three percent of survey 
respondents had a member of the household working off the farm, which was treated as 
“employment” following D’Souza et al., 1993. In general, off-farm income can subsidize a 
proportion of any loss in farm income. With those “supplements”, farmers may be encouraged to 
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undertake riskier crop rotations and to adopt additional conservation practices. Thirty-four 
percent of farm operators in the survey had earned a college or higher degree and the average of 
cropland operated in 2010 was approximately 1150 acres.          
            Survey summary statistics were compared with those in the 2007 Agricultural Census 
(USDA-NASS, 2007) for Kansas to examine the representativeness of the sample. Survey 
respondents have been farming on average 36 years, while the 2007 Agricultural Census 
(USDA-NASS, 2007) indicates the number of years that farmers have been working on their 
present farm is about 26 years. This difference may be due to the nature of the designed 
questions. The survey asked total years farming, but the agricultural census asked the number of 
years working on their present farms. Table 1 shows that survey respondents do not only work 
on their family farm, but also other farms and off-farm. Farms with more than 50 acres of crop 
land production and $ 10,000 in gross farm sales were surveyed, which eliminated a significant 
number of farms in Kansas. The 2007 Agricultural Census (USDA-NASS, 2007) indicates that 
11 percent of farmers in Kansas are female. In contrast, only 5 percent of the survey respondents 
are female. Moreover, survey respondents operate cropland at the average of 1150.41 acres 
rather than 863.01 acres from the 2007 Agricultural Census (USDA-NASS, 2007). Finally, 47% 
of farmers receive income off the farm is shown from the 2007 Agricultural Census (USDA-
NASS, 2007), while 53% of farmers earn income off the farm in 2010. Thus, there are 
approximately 33% and 13% increase in total acres and off-farm employment within four years 
period, respectively.  
            In this study, we model the joint and conditional adoption of conservation practice 
bundles. The conservation bundles are made up of up to three conservation practices used by the 
 50 
 
farmers surveyed in Kansas: no-till, cover crops and use of crediting of nutrients from manure. 
Those three conservation practices can form a total of eight conservation practice bundles that 
are listed in Table 2 with associated respondent adoption as a percentage.  We refer to these 
bundles as conservation (management) plans in the paper. More than half (52.17%) of survey 
respondents adopted the no-till only plan (N), while 33.41% of survey respondents adopted none 
of the conservation practice bundles listed in Table 2. These conservation practice bundles 
(management plans) serve as the dependent variable for the joint adoption model considered 
next.    
2.4. Methodology  
2.4.1 Theoretical Foundations 
            A significant purpose of the thesis is to develop a methodology for assessing the 
conditional adoption of alternative farm practices, which requires the use of a joint adoption 
framework. Suppose a farmer can choose from adopting r possible practices on the farm. These 
practices can form M = 2r conservation bundles or conservation management plans. Let 𝛿𝑚, m = 
0, 1, …, M, be a specific bundle, where 𝛿𝑚 is a (R x 1) vector of indicator variables, Yr, r = 1, …, 
R, equal to 1 if the rth practice is part of bundle m. Under the assumption of utility maximization, 
a farmer i derives utility from choosing bundle m with a given set of attributes /factors Xi that 
maximizes his or her utility umi. The utility for adopting bundle m can be represented as: 
                                𝑢𝑚𝑖 = 𝑈{𝐸 [𝑅(𝑋𝑖)]; 𝑍𝑖;  𝛽𝑚}       (1)          
where E[R (𝑋𝑖)] is expected profit from adopting the given bundle of conservation practices, 
𝑋𝑖 is a set of individual specific explanatory variables affecting the profit for bundle m, 𝑍𝑖  is a set 
of other variables that impact the utility for bundle m, 𝛽𝑚 is a vector of parameters specific to the 
utility received for adoption bundle m. Farmers’ decisions on adoption of conservation practices 
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are often influenced and motivated by other factors rather than profit related factors under a 
utility framework (Skaggs et al., 1994).  Thus, it is necessary to distinguish and separate those 
profit related variables and nonprofit but utility related variables, including farming experience, 
education and employment (Ervin and Ervin, 1982; D’Souza et al., 1993); age and other 
demographics (Skaggs et al., 1994).  A farmer will adopt bundle m if:  
       𝑢𝑚𝑖 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑢1𝑖, … , 𝑢𝑚𝑖 , … , 𝑢𝑀𝑖).         (2) 
2.4.2 Empirical Model 
 A researcher only observes the choice of bundle adopted. So the theoretical model 
represented by equations (1) and (2) can be viewed in a random utility framework. That is: 
𝑢𝑚𝑖 = 𝑉𝑚 {𝐸 [𝑅(𝑋𝑖)]; 𝑍𝑖;  𝛽𝑚} +  𝜀𝑚𝑖 
where 𝑉𝑚 is the determinist component of utility and  𝜀𝑚𝑖 is the random or unobserved 
component of utility (Louviere et al., 2000).  
If the residuals, 𝜀𝑚𝑖, m = 0,1, …, M are independently distributed with extreme value 
distribution (type 1), then the probability of a farmer choosing bundle m, 𝛿𝑚, can be written as: 
𝜋𝑚 = Pr(𝐼 = 𝑚) =
exp(𝑉𝑚 [𝐸 (𝑅(𝑋𝑖));𝑍𝑖; 𝛽𝑚)
∑ exp (𝑀𝑠=1 𝑉𝑠 [𝐸 (𝑅(𝑋𝑖)); 𝑍𝑖; 𝛽𝑠)
         (3) 
(where I is a polychotomous index equal to m if bundle m is chosen.) Thus, following the 
methods in Bergtold and Molnar (2010) and Wu and Babcock (1998), a polychotomous-choice 
selectivity model of adoption is employed in this study. A modified multinomial logistic 
regression model is used to examine the joint adoption of conservation practices by Kansas 
farmers. The adoption of these practices is conditional on a number of explanatory factors, 
including experience, farm sales, land tenure, participation in conservation programs, farmer 
perceptions, use of insurance, and a number of demographic variables.  
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For those farm characteristics, it is expected that farm size and rental percentage could 
have a positive effect on conservation practices. With larger farm size and more rent space, 
farmers are encouraged to plant and adopt more crops and management plans. Farmers 
participating in EQIP and/or CSP can obtain more information and gain more experience to 
increase the probability of adopting conservation practices. Compared with risk-averse farmers, 
risk-preference or risk-loving ones may choose higher return crops or conservation practices 
regardless time and region constrain.    
For farmer demographics and characteristics, we expect farmers’ operation experience, 
off-farm employment, insured crop insurance and farmers’ education level could increase the 
likelihood of adopting conservation practices. The influence of risk type and gender of farmer 
will depend on the specific type of conservation practice.  
            The weather, region and landscape attributes will affect adopting conservation practices 
differently with various management plans.  
With the limited number of observation for conservation management plan bundles CM 
and NCM listed in Table 2, it is assumed that P (I = CM) = 0, and P (I = NCM) = 0 (i.e. the 
probability of adopting these bundles is equal to zero, and where I is a ploychotomous index 
equal to m if bundle m is chosen), such that they will have no direct effect on the estimation of 
the model. Given the limited number of observations, the effects of the explanatory variables on 
the adoption of these management plans cannot be reliably identified. Thus, there are six 
conservation practices used. These assumptions are used in the calculation of other estimated 
statistics and then leave 2163 degree of freedom for the estimation of the model examining 
conservation practice adoption.  
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2.4.3 Unconditional, Conditional and Bivariate Marginal Effects   
Following equation (3) a multinomial logistic model is used to estimate the joint adoption 
of bundles of conservation practices. The model estimates the probability of adopting a bundle 
given a set of explanatory factors, but allows one to estimate the marginal probability of adopting 
a single practice; and conditional probability of adopting a practice given other practice adoption. 
Marginal effects can be derived for all of these types of probabilities.  
It is difficult to interpret the meaning of coefficients in the multinomial logistic model. 
The marginal effects of explanatory variables on the probability of adopting a bundle of practices 
provide a measure to assess the impact of specific explanatory factors. The marginal effects 
provide both a sign and magnitude for the marginal change in an explanatory variable on the 
probability of adoption. These marginal effects can be expressed as (Greene, 2012): 
     
𝜕𝜋𝑚
𝜕𝑥𝑘
= 𝜋𝑚[𝛽𝑚 − ∑ 𝜋𝑠𝛽𝑠
𝑀
𝑠=0 ]            (4)  
It should be noted that the sign of the marginal effects may not follow the sign of 𝛽𝑚 for m = 
0,1,…,M.   
Wu and Babcock (1998) emphasize that the unconditional marginal probability of 
adopting a practice or single element of a conservation bundle sequence may be of interest. The 
marginal probability of adopting a single practice can be derived from the joint modeling 
framework as: 
                                                           𝑃𝑠 =  ∑ 𝜋𝑚𝑚𝜖{𝛿𝑚∶ 𝑌𝑠=1}         (5) 
where s is the index for the single practice of interest and YS is an indicator variable equal to 1 
when practice s is included in bundle m. The associated marginal effects for the marginal 
probabilities can be expressed as (Wu and Babcock, 1998): 
     
𝜕𝑃𝑠
𝜕𝑥𝑘
=  ∑
𝜕𝜋𝑚
𝜕𝑥𝑘
𝑚𝜖{𝛿𝑚∶ 𝑌𝑠=1}             (6) 
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Joint probabilities of adopting two or more practices can be derived, as well. For 
example, the probability that a farmer jointly adopts two conservation practices is: 
                                                   𝑃𝑟𝑠 =  ∑ 𝜋𝑚,𝑚𝜖{𝛿𝑚∶ 𝑌𝑟=1,𝑌𝑠=1}          (7)  
which is useful when examining conditional adoption between practices. The associated 
marginal effect for the bivariate probability given by equation (7) is: 
   
𝜕𝑃𝑟𝑠
𝜕𝑋𝑘
=  ∑
𝜕𝜋𝑚
𝜕𝑋𝑘
𝑚𝜖{𝛿𝑚∶ 𝑌𝑟=1,𝑌𝑠=1}        (8) 
The joint adoption or multinomial model estimated allows for the estimation of 
conditional probabilities. For example, one can estimate the adoption of cover crops, given no-
tillage has been adopted. This may assist in examining what factors affect farmers’ choices to 
intensify conservation efforts on-farm to help develop outreach strategies and incentive 
mechanisms. Using this framework, the adoption of practice s given practice r has already been 
adopted can be represented as:  
        Ps|r =  
Psr
Pr
              (9) 
where the marginal and bivariate probabilities are given by equation (5) and (7). Of particular 
interest is the estimation of marginal effect of the explanatory variables for the conditional 
probabilities assessed. These can be obtained by differentiating the conditional probability with 
respect to an explanatory variable of interest (k):  
  
𝜕𝑃𝑠|𝑟
𝜕𝑋𝑘
=  
𝜕𝑃𝑠𝑟
𝜕𝑋𝑘
∗𝑃𝑟− 𝑃𝑠𝑟∗ 
𝜕𝑃𝑟
𝜕𝑋𝑘
𝑃𝑟
2           (10) 
 
where the associated marginal effects for the marginal and bivariate probabilities are given by 
equations (6) and (8). It should be emphasized that all the marginal effects estimated can be done 
using the joint probabilities and marginal effects estimated using the joint multinomial logistic 
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model given by equations by (3) and (4). That is, the joint framework inherently captures the 
dependencies between adopting different practices. 
To test for the significance of marginal effect, asymptotic estimates of the standard errors 
are required. Given the complexity of some of the equations of the marginal effects above, the 
method of Krinsky and Robb (1986) is utilized to estimate the asymptotic standard errors for the 
calculation of asymptotic z-statistics (see Greene 2012, as well). All marginal effects were 
calculated as partial averages. 
2.5. Result and Discussion 
For this study, the empirical joint multinomial model is estimated using NLOGIT 4.0. 
MATLAB is then used to estimate marginal effects and associated asymptotic standard errors. 
Parameter estimates for the model are provided in appendix A. The model was estimated with 
2163 observation. The McFadden Pseudo R-square for the regression model is equal to 0.0823. 
Marginal effects of the explanatory variables are of more interest than coefficient estimates 
which are not readily interpretable in the multinomial logistic model (Greene, 2012). Marginal 
effects and associated asymptotic statistics from the multinomial model for the adoption of 
different conservation bundles are estimated and presented in Table 3.  
There may exist potential complementarities or substitutability between practices and it is 
of interest to examine unconditional marginal probabilities, bivariate probabilities and 
conditional probabilities. Estimated marginal effects of the explanatory variables for the 
probability of adopting each conservation plan and practice under both unconditional and 
conditional perspectives, along with the associated asymptotic standard errors are shown in 
Table 4. 
2.5.1 Conservation Practice Bundle (Management Plan) Adoption 
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Examining the marginal effects of different explanatory factors on the adoption of 
conservation practice bundles shows that different factors impact different conservation practice 
bundles/management plans.  
No-Tillage Only (N): Available water content, farm size, percent of land rented, participation in 
EQIP and/or CSP, off-farm employment, having crop insurance, gender, having a college degree, 
and living in eastern Kansas increased the likelihood of only adopting this management plan. 
Higher risk of erosion and raising livestock decreased the likelihood of only adopting this 
conservation practice bundle. Risk of erosion is likely to increase the use of conservation 
practices that will decrease the potential for erosion, helping to maintain soil productivity. Off-
farm employment and having a college degree increased the probability of only adopting no-
tillage by 6.9% and 6.6% at a one percent level of significance, respectively. Off-farm 
employment can subsidize a proportion of the potential loss in farm income to encourage Kansas 
farmers to adopt no-tillage. In addition, adoption of no-tillage may reduce labor requirements on-
time, freeing up time for additional off-farm employment or allowing farm size and revenue to 
increase. In contrast, raising cattle and/or hogs lowered the probability of only adopting no-
tillage by 7.0%. Enrollment in a conservation program increased the likelihood of adoption by 
8.1%, emphasizing the impact of financial incentives on adoption.   
Cover Crops Only (C): Land characteristics, such as higher risk of soil erosion and greater 
variability in field slopes increased the likelihood of only adopting cover crops. Higher available 
water content in the soil, renting more acres, residing in eastern Kansas, and a greater chance of 
drought decreased the likelihood of only adopting this management plan. Living in eastern 
Kansas decreased the probability of only adopting cover crops by 1.5% at a one percent level of 
significance. Higher available water content and renting more land decreased the likelihood of 
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choosing only cover crops by 27.3% and 0.9% at 5% significant level, respectively. Cover crops 
may use available water content, reducing its availability for the following cash crop, and 
farmers may be less likely to plant riskier conservation practices, like cover crops, on rental land.   
Credit Nutrients from Manure Only (M): Few factors considered impacted the adoption of this 
management plan. The only statistically significant factors were having a college degree and the 
raising of livestock on farm. Survey respondents were 1.7% more likely to only adopt the 
crediting of manure as they raised cattle and/ or hogs. Fuglie and Bosch (1995) mentioned that 
raising livestock could provide guidance on managing manure application for both farming land 
and pastures. Thus, raising cattle and/ or hogs significantly increased the use of manure but has 
no significant or little effect on the probability of adopting cover crops which is associated with 
soil and weeds management.    
No-Tillage and Cover Crops (NC): Renting more acres and participating in the EQIP or CSP 
increased the likelihood of adopting this management plan. Describing yourself as a risk-avoider, 
being male and residing in eastern KS decreased the likelihood of adopting this management 
plan.  
No-Tillage and Credit Nutrients from Manure (NM): Farm size, renting more acres, participating 
in EQIP and CSP, raising livestock, and residing in either eastern or western Kansas increased 
the likelihood of adopting this management plan. Being a male operator reduced the likelihood 
of adopting this plan.  
            For the joint adoption of NC and NM, residence in Eastern Kansas lowered the likelihood 
of joint adopting no-tillage and cover crops (NC) by 1.8%, but significantly increased the 
probability of jointly choosing no-tillage and use of manure (NM) by 2.6%. Renting more land 
and participating in EQIP and/ or CSP both raised the probability of jointly adopting no-tillage 
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and cover crops (NC), and no-tillage and use of manure (NM). In contrast, being a male operator 
reduced the likelihood of jointly adopting either no-tillage and cover crops (NC) or no-tillage and 
use of manure (NM).  
No Practices (None): Higher erosion potential and farm size contribute to potentially adopting no 
conservation practice bundle. It could be that marginal lands with high erosion potential are more 
likely to be retired (e.g. put in the Conservation Reserve Program or similar program) by a 
farmer or landowner rather than remain in production. Higher available water content in the soil, 
higher percentage of rented acres, participating in EQIP or CSP, farm experience, being 
employed off farm, having crop insurance, being male, having a college degree and living in 
eastern Kansas all reduced the likelihood that no conservation practice bundle would be adopted. 
The possibility of taking advantage of a conservation program’s benefits and having crop 
insurance that may help to alleviate potential risks of adoption both have the ability of reducing 
the costs of adoption, increasing the adoption of some type of bundle of conservation practices. 
In addition, education, maintaining productive soils, and protecting rented lands all are factors 
that seem to motivate farmers to act on conservation and not take the “none” option.  
2.5.2 Unconditional Adoption of No Tillage, Cover Crops and Manure Application 
The unconditional probability of adopting a practice is approximately 59% for no-tillage 
(N); 8.1% for cover crops (C); and 9.2 % for crediting of nutrients from manure (M), 
respectively. These probability results are quite different from what has been mentioned in Table 
3 which eliminates the internal and external influences among those conservation plans and 
practices. For the single adoption of a practice, many marginal effects of the explanatory 
variables are significant at the 10% level or above.  
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Unconditional Adoption of No-Tillage: Higher erosion potential, farm size, farm experience, 
raising livestock, and a greater chance of drought increased the likelihood of adopting this 
management plan. Higher available water content, percent of land rented, participating in EQIP 
and/ or CSP, being employed off farm, being a male operator, having a college degree, residing 
in eastern Kansas, and greater variability of drought decreased the likelihood of adopting this 
management plan. Many of the signs follow those for the management bundles described above. 
Of interest is that, no tillage is more likely to be adopted to maintain soil productivity, to reduce 
erosion and protect soil water content. While education reduced the likelihood of adoption, it 
may be that farmers are becoming more experienced with conservation tillage practices and 
realize that different tillage practices may be needed in different cropping systems.   
Unconditional Adoption of Cover Crops: Available water content, farm size, percent of land 
rented, percent of irrigated land, participating in EQIP and/ or CSP, being employed off farm, 
having crop insurance, being a male operator, having a college degree, residing in eastern Kansas 
increased the likelihood of adopting this management plan. The land characteristic, higher risk of 
soil erosion is the only factor that decreased the likelihood of adopting this management plan. 
Having a college degree raised the probability of adopting cover crops by 7.4% at a one percent 
level of significance. It seems that availability of water, in the soil or via irrigation, increases the 
likelihood of adoption by a considerable amount, potentially due to the lower risk for the 
following cash crop.    
Unconditional Adoption of Crediting Nutrients from Manure: Participating in EQIP and/ or CSP 
is the only element that increased the likelihood of adopting this conservation practice. Available 
water content, describing yourself as a risk-avoider, being a male operator, and residing in 
eastern Kansas decreased the likelihood of adopting this practice. Again, program incentives are 
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likely to increase adoption of conservation practices, while riskier practices (as perceived by the 
farmer) are less likely to be adopted.  
Education seems to decrease the likelihood of adopting no-tillage, but increase the 
probability of choosing cover crops significantly. Participating in EQIP and/or CSP significantly 
affects all three unconditional practice adoptions. Particularly, participating in EQIP and/or CSP 
increases the probability of adopting cover crops and use of manure by 5.9% and 4.1%, 
respectively, but decreases the probability of adopting no-tillage by 11.5%, which may be due to 
current programmatic focuses. Thus, education and conservation programs are still important 
tools for promoting adoption. While most studies focus on the adoption of a single practice, this 
may ignore potential complementarities or substitutability (i.e. dependencies) between practices, 
but the joint framework will implicitly take account of this. 
2.5.3 Unconditional Simultaneous Adoption of Two Conservation Practices 
The joint adoption framework allows one to examine the simultaneous adoption or 
bundles of practices which can help to assess factors that affect the intensity of adoption on-farm, 
though, the joint adoption framework does not pick up the potential sequential nature of adoption 
or piece-meal approach. Not many of the factors considered impact the joint adoption of two 
conservation practices. Having a college degree and raising livestock increase the likelihood of 
adopting no-tillage and cover crops, and greater variability in field slopes decreases the 
likelihood of choosing this management plan by 0.7%. Percent of land rented and participating in 
EQIP and/or CSP significantly raise the likelihood of adopting no-tillage and use of manure by 
2.2% and 2.5%, respectively, and being a risk avoider and a male operator will lower the 
likelihood of choosing this management plan. These estimates provide guidance on the adoption 
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of bundles of practices, which may be of interest for policymakers’ wanting to intensify practices 
on working agricultural lands. 
2.5.4 Conditional Adoption of Conservation Practices 
In this study, we proposed using the joint adoption framework to look at the conditional 
probabilities of adopting conservation practices. This knowledge may help to find out what it 
would take to get people to increase the size of their bundles of practices or adopt additional 
practices, based on complementarities with other conservation practices. The conditional 
probabilities were chosen based on the adoption patterns found in the survey. For example, it 
would be less likely that cover crops would be adopted as a conservation practice prior to the 
adoption of no-tillage.  Silage farmers Jeffrey and Penny Stevens, participating in the SARE 
(Sustainable Agriculture Research and Education)-funded project in New England states, 
illustrated that they had always adopted winter cover crops after no-tillage, which could lower 
the fuel costs and help to replace some fertilizer inputs (USDA—SARE, 2013). In addition, it 
may make more management sense to adopt no-tillage prior to the adoption of cover crops, given 
cover crops increases the amount of residue on the soul surface and increases management 
intensity significantly. From this study, the estimated conditional probability of adopting cover 
crops given no-till has been adopted is 6.4%, while the conditional probability of crediting 
nutrients from manure as a fertilizer given no-till has been adopted is 11.1%.   
Based on the analysis of this study, we find that farmers who have already adopted no-
tillage are more likely to adopt cover crops if they have a college degree and/or raising livestock.  
For example, farmers with a college degree are 9.1% more likely to adopt cover crops given no-
tillage adopted. Farm size, percent of land rented, and participating in EQIP and/or CSP increase 
the likelihood of adopting use of manure given no-tillage adopted. Particularly, farmers raising 
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cattle and/or hogs are 6.2% more likely to choose the crediting of nutrients from manure given 
no-tillage adopted. In contrast, survey respondents are 2.8% less likely to choose the manure 
conservation practice given no-tillage adopted is they are risk avoiders. Again, these estimates 
may be useful for policy-maker interested in getting farmers who already have adopted given 
conservation to intensify their conservation efforts by adopting additional practices.  
2.6. Conclusion 
Conservation practices significantly affect the whole production system on-farm, as well 
as soil and water conservation. In order to provide useful guidance and inference, we conducted 
this study to examine and analyze the adoption of conservation practices by Kansas farmers from 
both a joint and conditional viewpoint, and the socio-economic and farm factors affecting the 
adoption. We first model the joint adoption of conservation practices with a multinomial 
modeling framework and then utilize this framework to estimate conditional probabilities of 
adopting conservation practices given the adoption of other practices. This provides a novel 
contribution to the adoption literature on how to examine adoption conditionally using cross-
sectional data.   
The joint adoption framework is employed to develop a methodology for assessing the 
conditional adoption of alternative farm practices. A modified multinomial logistic regression 
model is then used to examine the joint adoption of conservation practices by Kansas farmers, 
while the adoption of these practices is conditional on a number of explanatory factors. As 
coefficient estimates are not readily interpretable in the multinomial logistic model, marginal 
effect is necessary and essential to be estimated for this study. The marginal effects are derived 
from the associated probabilities which are built under the random utility model. Conservation 
practice adoption is not only complex and multifaceted, but also a dynamic learning process 
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being filled with knowledge collecting, information evaluating, decisions making and goals 
reaching. Farmers need to take into account the interrelated nature of conservation practices and 
other agricultural practices, as well as the social and economic factors that affect the adoption of 
conservation practices.  
Conservation practice adoption is a long learning process (Ghadim and Pannell 1999). 
Land operators need to balance the benefit brought from conservation practice adoption, as well 
as the cost of collecting, integrating and evaluating new information for a better decision making. 
Also, farmers’ self-learning ability is required for the innovation to their own situation (Ghadim 
and Pannell 1999). Results of this study show that both experience and education play an 
important role in promoting adoption of new practices and conservation intensification. 
Extension agents should spend time and resource to provide useful and reasonable guidance for 
farmers and land owners about conservation practices and think about the role of participatory 
research approaches. In addition, more effective and adoptable conservation practices should 
continue to be promoted using conservation programs and financial incentives to promote 
adoption, intensification and replace undesirable practices. Study results emphasize the strong 
ability of these programs and incentives to promote adoption of single practices, bundles of 
practices and conservation intensification.  
There may be existing potential endogeneity with no-tillage, EQIP and CSP, which were 
not modeled here, but should be considered in the future. Insurance variables are not included in 
the model, but may impact choice of tillage and should be included in future studies. 
Furthermore, specific hypotheses should be explored rather than correlations among various 
explanatory variables. A significant avenue for future research revolves around the fact that this 
study was done using cross-sectional data. While the study provides a methodology for providing 
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a deeper analysis of the data, a panel dataset over multiple periods of time would provide a much 
richer analysis and is an area for future research.  
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Table 2.1. Definition of Explanatory Variables and Summary Statistics (N = 2163) 
 
Variables Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Definition 
 
Landscape  
Attributes 
KW Factor 0.30 0.10 Spatially weighted average K-W factor in the counties farmers operate 
Available Water 
Content 
0.16 0.06 
Spatially weighted average of available water content in the counties farmers 
operate  
Std Slope 3.78 1.58 Standard deviation of slope within the counties farmers operate 
Farm  
Characteristics 
Farm Size 1150.41 6524.27 Total cropland acres operated in 2010 
Rental Percentage 0.41 0.37 Percent of farm acres rented 
Irrigation Percent 0.05 0.21 Percent of crop land irrigated 
Livestock 0.52 0.50 Cattle and/or hogs raised on farmers' operation in 2010 (1 = yes, 0 = no) 
EQIP and CSP 0.12 0.32 
Farmer participates in Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) and/or 
Conservation Security/Stewardship Program (CSP) in 2010 (1 = yes, 0 = no) 
Farmer  
Demographics  
and 
Characteristics 
Experience 35.85 15.04 Number of years the operator has been farming 
Risk Avoider 0.40 0.49 Farmer describes themselves as a risk avoider (1 = yes, 0 = no) 
Off-Farm Employ 0.53 0.50 Farmers or their immediate families employed off the farm (1 = yes, 0 = no) 
Crop Insurance 0.68 0.47 Farmer does not use insurance ( 1= yes, 0 = no) 
Gender 0.95 0.23 Gender of farm operator (1 = male, 0 = female) 
College 0.34 0.47 Farm operator has earned a college degree (1 = yes, 0 = no) 
Region 
West 0.23 0.42 Agricultural reporting district 10, 20 or 30 (1 = west, 0 = other area) 
East 0.32 0.47 Agricultural reporting district 70, 80 or 90 (1 = east, 0 = other area) 
Weather 
Average PZ 0.52 0.11 Mean Palmer Z Drought over past 10 years  
Std PZ 2.04 0.13 Standard deviation of the Palmer Z Drought over past 10 years 
The standard deviation of all binary variables is calculated as:√𝑝(1 − 𝑝), where p is the mean of the binary variable. 
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Table 2.2. Conservation Plans Adopting Crops Using No-Till, Cover Crops and Manure 
In-Field Conservation Practices 
Management 
Plan 
No-Till 
(N) 
Cover 
Crops (C) 
Credit Nutrients 
from Manure 
(M) 
Percent of  
Respondents Using Plan 
N X − − 52.27 
C − X − 1.68 
M − − X 1.90 
NC X X − 4.19 
NM X − X 5.48 
CM − X X 0.09 
NCM X X X 0.99 
NONE − − − 33.41 
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Table 2.3. Marginal Effects for the Adoption of Different Conservation Practices/Bundles  
Variables NONE No-Till Cover Crops 
Manure 
Practice 
No-Till and 
Cover Crops 
No-Till and 
Manure 
Practice 
KW Factor 
1.112*** -1.387*** 0.119* -0.039 -0.029 0.225 
(0.418) (0.449) (0.061) (0.056) (0.161) (0.195) 
Available 
Water Content 
-2.264*** 2.787*** -0.273** 0.046 0.131 -0.427 
(0.762) (0.817) (0.121) (0.100) (0.290) (0.353) 
Std Slope 
0.007 -0.001 0.002* -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
Farm Size 
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Rental  
Percentage 
-0.137*** 0.100*** -0.009** -0.005 0.022** 0.029** 
(0.030) (0.031) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.013) 
Irrigation 
Percent 
-0.049 0.094 -0.035 0.004 -0.055 0.041 
(0.067) (0.074) (0.022) (0.007) (0.040) (0.028) 
EQIP and CSP 
-0.124*** 0.081** 0.003 -0.007 0.026*** 0.021* 
(0.038) (0.037) (0.004) (0.006) (0.010) (0.013) 
Experience 
-0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Risk Avoider 
0.013 0.014 -0.002 0.003 -0.016** -0.013 
(0.021) (0.022) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.010) 
Off-Farm  
Employ 
-0.078*** 0.069*** -0.004 -0.001 0.009 0.004 
(0.021) (0.022) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.010) 
Crop Insurance 
-0.022 0.044* -0.003 -0.001 -0.004 -0.014 
(0.023) (0.024) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.010) 
Gender 
-0.090* 0.164*** -0.006 0.005 -0.028* -0.045** 
(0.046) (0.052) (0.005) (0.008) (0.015) (0.018) 
College 
-0.080*** 0.066*** -0.005 0.005* 0.002 0.011 
(0.023) (0.024) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.010) 
Livestock 
0.018 -0.070*** -0.002 0.017*** -0.000 0.037*** 
(0.021) (0.023) (0.003) (0.005) (0.009) (0.010) 
West 
-0.010 -0.003 -0.005 0.001 -0.011 0.029** 
(0.031) (0.032) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.013) 
East 
-0.061** 0.070** -0.015*** -0.001 -0.018* 0.026** 
(0.027) (0.028) (0.005) (0.003) (0.010) (0.012) 
Average PZ 
0.121 -0.167 -0.035** 0.022 0.034 0.024 
(0.115) (0.123) (0.016) (0.017) (0.047) (0.050) 
Std PZ 
-0.079 0.188 0.008 -0.017 -0.051 -0.049 
(0.108) (0.115) (0.015) (0.013) (0.043) (0.052) 
1. Standard errors are presented in parentheses;  
2. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 2.4. Estimated Marginal Effects for the Unconditional and Conditional Adoption of No-Till, Cover Crops and Manure 
 
Variables 
Unconditional Practice Adoption 
Unconditional Adoption  
of Two Practices 
Conditional Adoption 
No-Till Cover Crops 
Crediting 
Nutrients 
from 
Manure 
No-Till and  
Cover Crops 
No-Till and 
Manure 
Practice 
Cover Crops 
Given No-Till 
Adopted 
Manure 
Practice Given 
No-Till  
Adopted 
KW Factor 
0.728* -1.550*** 0.427 -0.141 -0.044 -0.350 -0.179 
(0.449) (0.451) (0.299) (0.197) (0.160) (0.427) (0.278) 
Available Water 
Content 
-1.407* 3.043*** -0.900* 0.185 0.161 0.505 0.480 
(0.816) (0.820) (0.575) (0.348) (0.293) (0.752) (0.507) 
Std Slope 
-0.005 -0.006 0.002 -0.007* -0.003 -0.013 -0.004 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.009) (0.005) 
Farm Size 
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Rental 
Percentage 
-0.102*** 0.100*** -0.012 -0.015 0.022*** -0.018 0.054*** 
(0.033) (0.033) (0.023) (0.016) (0.008) (0.033) (0.016) 
Irrigation  
Percentage 
-0.028 0.1467* -0.184 0.015 -0.047 0.032 -0.078 
(0.090) (0.091) (0.123) (0.025) (0.043) (0.065) (0.071) 
EQIP and CSP 
-0.115*** 0.059* 0.041** -0.020 0.025** -0.025 0.062*** 
(0.038) (0.037) (0.019) (0.021) (0.011) (0.043) (0.019) 
Experience 
0.002** -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Risk Avoider 
0.007 0.018 -0.022* 0.010 -0.015* 0.019 -0.028* 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) (0.020) (0.015) 
Off_Farm 
Employ 
-0.045** 0.057** -0.006 -0.004 0.008 -0.002 0.022 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.014) (0.010) (0.009) (0.019) (0.015) 
Crop 
Insurance 
-0.020 0.042* -0.017 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.013) (0.009) (0.008) (0.020) (0.014) 
Gender 
-0.108** 0.173*** -0.043* 0.015 -0.024* 0.041 -0.027 
(0.052) (0.053) (0.023) (0.029) (0.015) (0.059) (0.026) 
College -0.048** 0.074*** -0.016 0.016* 0.002 0.037* 0.011 
 73 
 
(continued) 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.015) (0.010) (0.008) (0.023) (0.014) 
Livestock 
0.063*** -0.034 -0.012 0.050*** -0.002 0.091** -0.014 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.013) (0.017) (0.008) (0.040) (0.014) 
West 
-0.019 0.003 -0.021 0.002 -0.010 0.007 -0.013 
(0.033) (0.032) (0.018) (0.014) (0.012) (0.028) (0.020) 
East 
-0.064** 0.082*** -0.064*** -0.001 -0.015 0.004 -0.016 
(0.029) (0.029) (0.022) (0.012) (0.011) (0.027) (0.018) 
Average PZ 
0.256** -0.090 -0.094 0.065 0.031 0.097 0.011 
(0.123) (0.124) (0.079) (0.062) (0.049) (0.135) (0.084) 
Std PZ 
-0.205* 0.153 0.011 -0.050 -0.046 -0.075 -0.048 
(0.114) (0.114) (0.073) (0.047) (0.045) (0.098) (0.077) 
1. Standard errors are presented in parentheses;   
2. ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.    
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  Appendix A.2. Parameter Estimates for the Multinomial Logistic Model of Conservation Practices 
Variables No-Till 
Cover  
Crops 
Crediting 
Nutrients 
from 
Manure 
No-Till and 
Cover Crops 
No-Till and 
Manure Practice 
Constant 
-1.985** -1.099 -1.588 -0.490 -1.491 
(0.925) (3.952) (2.962) (2.318) (1.937) 
KW Factor 
-6.000*** 12.913 -8.605 -4.475 0.597 
(2.047) (8.235) (7.087) (4.877) (4.127) 
Available Water 
Content 
12.150*** -30.703* 13.223 11.133 -0.636 
(3.727) (15.666) (12.698) (8.867) (7.470) 
Std Slope 
-0.026 0.211* -0.302** -0.102 -0.069 
(0.035) (0.114) (0.137) (0.090) (0.072) 
Farm Size 
0.000*** 0.000 -0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Rental 
Percentage 
 Risk avoider 
0.618*** -0.755 -0.223 1.075*** 0.991*** 
(0.143) (0.547) (0.485) (0.324) (0.284) 
Irrigation 
Percentage 
0.318 -4.685 0.673 -1.386 0.930 
(0.321) (3.334) (0.922) (1.195) (0.606) 
EQIP and CSP 
0.545*** 0.869 -0.460 1.130*** 0.801*** 
(0.183) (0.575) (0.751) (0.312) (0.290) 
Experience 
0.001*** 0.000 0.004 0.004 0.000 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.000) 
Risk 
Avoider 
-0.019 -0.246 0.367 -0.494** -0.289 
(0.102) (0.363) (0.329) (0.245) (0.211) 
Off_Farm 
Employ 
0.373*** (-0.276) 0.120 0.521** 0.341* 
(0.102) (0.367) (0.334) (0.239) 0.204 
Crop 
Insurance 
0.146 -0.384 -0.077 -0.040 -0.191 
(0.110) (0.376) (0.337) (0.250) (0.216) 
Gender 
0.572** -0.4967 0.864 -0.487 -0.561 
(0.233) (0.625) (1.040) (0.444) (0.383) 
College 
0.374*** -0.477 0.920*** 0.328 0.466** 
(0.110) (0.444) (0.334) (0.240) (0.212) 
Livestock 
-0.177* -0.362 2.081*** -0.067 0.641*** 
(0.104) (0.363) (0.497) (0.240) (0.221) 
West 
0.029 -0.688 0.117 -0.273 0.574** 
(0.151) (0.519) (0.485) (0.350) (0.293) 
East 
0.317** -1.945*** 0.073 -0.321 0.692*** 
(0.130) (0.641) (0.434) (0.306) (0.264) 
Average PZ 
-0.680 -5.256** 2.343 0.569 0.062 
(0.563) (2.191) (2.191) (1.434) (1.060) 
Std PZ 
0.577 1.392 -1.898 -1.188 -0.674 
(0.525) (2.102) (1.679) (1.298) (1.099) 
1. Standard errors are presented in parentheses;  
2. ***, **, * indicate statistical significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.    
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Chapter 3 - Testing for Functional Form Misspecification in the 
Logistic Regression Model: RESET and OPRESET Tests 
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3.1. Introduction 
            Model misspecification problems in regression models, such as the logistic regression 
model, can be caused by omitted variables, unmodelled dependence and heterogeneity, and 
incorrect functional form. In logistic regression models, the functional form refers to the 
functional relationship between the dependent binary variables and set of regressors or 
explanatory variables (Press and Wilson, 1978). Bierens (1982, 1984) developed consistent 
model misspecification tests to assess functional forms of regression models, however the null 
distribution of the test statistics involved was intractable. Bierens (1987) and Bierens and Hartog 
(1988) developed a tractable null distribution, but the consistency of the tests relied on 
randomization of test parameters. Later, Bierens (1990) showed that any conditional moment test 
of functional form for nonlinear regression model would be converted into a chi-square test. 
McGuirk et al. (1993) employed a comprehensive set of individual and joint misspecification 
tests that could help identify misspecification sources, including functional forms. Bergtold et al. 
(2010) developed a probabilistic reduction approach to check Bernoulli regression models with 
binary dependent variables for misspecification problems.  
            The function specification of logistic regression model depends on the choice of 
transformation (e.g. logistic cdf) and predictor (or index) function (Bergtold et al., 2010). 
Bergtold et al. (2010) show that the functional form assumption is tired up with the proper choice 
of predictor function and the choice of the logistic cumulative density function (cdf) for the 
transformation function arises naturally. Kay and Little (1987) illustrate that the probabilistic 
structure of the explanatory variables can be used to specify the function form of the index 
function, but it can be increasingly difficult in cases with many explanatory variables. Functional 
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misspecification of the index function can result in biased and inconsistent estimates which can 
bring wrong inference.  
            Thus, it is essential to have a probative functional form test that can pick up potential 
misspecification in the model to help assess if the logistic regression model is statistically 
adequate. Given that the predictor function is usually assumed to be linear in the parameters and 
the explanatory variables, a RESET-type test may be used to test for functional specification. 
Bergtold et al. (2010) proposed this approach in testing for functional specification of their 
empirical example in their paper.  
            Ramsey (1969) derived distributions of classical linear least-square residuals and then 
derived procedures to test for the specification errors. Ramsey (1969) suggested the RESET 
(Regression Equation Specification Error Test) test, which tests linearity in the linear regression 
model. The RESET test seeks to uncover nonlinearities in the functional form. The RESET is 
ideal test for functional form with high power over a wide variety of alterative hypotheses, which 
uses 2nd and higher order of the models’ fitted vales of the dependent variables. For the test 
proposed by Betdtold et al. (2010), linearity or the functional form of the predictor is tested using 
the fitted predictor values. A potential problem with the use of regular polynomials of the fitted 
predictor (or dependent variables in the RESET test) is that the set of polynomials may lead to 
collinearity problems during estimation (Shacham and Brauner, 1997). A potential solution to 
this problem is the use of orthogonal polynomials, which may provide a more robust method for 
assessing a wider variety of functional forms. Orthogonal polynomials can span the space of 
square integrable functions, which would likely include many of the functional forms of interest 
to econometric modelers (Kreyszig, 1978).  
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            The purpose of this study is to develop a robust test based on the classic RESET test 
using orthogonal polynomials to assess the linearity (in the variables) of the predictor or index 
function of the logistic regression model. Specifically, the paper will develop a misspecification 
test, the OPRESET or Orthogonal Polynomial RESET, built upon the RESET, to test the 
functional specification of logistic regression models; assess the properties of the test for 
different functional form assumptions of the predictor/index function by conducting a simulation 
experiment; and provide guidance on the use of the OPRESET test in applied regression model 
development.    
 3.2. Methods 
3.2.1 Logistic Regression Model 
            Let 𝑌𝑖 be a Bernoulli random variable with unconditional mean 𝑝 = 𝐏(𝑌𝑖 = 1), giving a 
variance equal to 𝑝 (1 − 𝑝). Then, let 𝐗𝑖 be a (𝐾 × 1) vector of explanatory variables. The 
conditional probability of 𝑌𝑖 given 𝐗𝑖 is: 𝐏(𝑌𝑖 = 1|𝐗𝑖) = [1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝{−𝜂(𝐗𝒊; 𝜷)}]
−1, where 
𝜂(𝐗𝒊; 𝜷) is the predictor or index function. This can be represented as: 
𝑌𝑖 = [1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝{−𝜂(𝐗𝒊; 𝜷)}]
−1 + 𝑢𝑖,    (1) 
where 𝑢𝑖 is a zero mean IID random error term.  The functional form of 𝜂(𝐗𝒊; 𝜷) is usually 
chosen to be linear in the explanatory variables, parameters or both, but is dependent upon 
the distributional properties of the explanatory variables (Bergtold et al. 2010; Kay and Little 
1987). For example, Kay and Little (1987) show that if the set of explanatory variables 
conditional on the dependent variable is multivariate normal, then, in general, the predictor 
will be quadratic in the explanatory variables.  
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            The most commonly used estimator for logistic regression model is the maximum 
likelihood estimator (MLE). The log-likelihood function used to estimate the logistic 
regression model is: 
𝐿(𝜷; 𝑌𝑖 , 𝐗𝒊) = ∑ 𝑌𝑖ln(𝐹(𝐗𝒊; 𝜷)) + (1 − 𝑌𝑖)ln(1 − 𝐹(𝐗𝒊; 𝜷))𝑖 ,  (2) 
where 𝐹(𝐗𝒊; 𝜷) = [1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝{−𝜂(𝐗𝒊; 𝜷)}]
−1. To find the estimates of 𝜷, the log-likelihood 
function given by equation (2) is maximized given the data.  
3.2.2 RESET Test   
            The Ramsey Regression Equation Specification Error Test (RESET) test is a general 
specification test for the linear regression model (Ramsey, 1969). More specifically, it tests 
whether non-linear combinations of the fitted values (i.e. predicted dependent variable) help to 
explain the response variable, indicating potential nonlinearities that are not being modeled. In 
addition, the RESET test can be regarded as a test of general misspecification (Ramsey, 1969).  
            Ramsey (1969) developed the RESET (Regression Equation Specification Error Test) to 
test the statistical specification of the linear regression model. The hypotheses being tested is: 
H0: 𝐸(𝑌𝑡/𝑋𝑡 = 𝑥𝑡) = 𝑥𝑡𝛽     vs.      H1: 𝐸(𝑌𝑡/𝑋𝑡 = 𝑥𝑡) = ℎ(𝑥𝑡) 
where ℎ(𝑥𝑡) is some non-linear function of xt (Spanos, 1986). The RESET testing procedure can 
be summarized as follows (Ramanathan, 1998): 
1) Estimate the general model by OLS and save the predicted values, 𝑌?̂?. 
2) Generate the variables 𝑌?̂?
2
,𝑌?̂?
3
,𝑌?̂?
4
, etc. and add them to the model in step (1) and re-
estimate. 
3) Use an F-test to assess the statistical significance of the estimated coefficients for the 
polynomials of the fitted values in step (2).  
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            For example, assume a modeler estimates Y = 𝛼1 + α2𝑋1 + α3𝑋2 + 𝜀 and the true 
regression is nonlinear. The modeler can test for this by first estimating the model to obtain ?̂? =
𝛼1̂ + α2̂ 𝑋1 + α3̂ 𝑋2. Then, the modeler will calculate ?̂?
2 and put it in the original regression to 
obtain: Y = 𝛼1 + α2𝑋1 + α3𝑋2 + 𝛽?̂?
2 + 𝜀. The square of ?̂?obtained from second regression 
depends both on the squares of 𝑋1 and 𝑋2 and on their cross–product 𝑋1𝑋2. The RESET test 
amounts then to testing the significance of the estimated 𝛽. Rejection of the null hypothesis 
merely indicates that the equation has been misspecified. As in general misspecification test, the 
null hypothesis should not be taken to be the true model.  
            As noted in the introduction, the traditional RESET test uses regular polynomials, which 
may result in near-multicollinearity among the polynomials of the fitted values, problems during 
estimation problems, and biased inference. A potential solution to this problem is the use of 
orthogonal polynomials, which do not suffer from this problem (Shacham and Brauner, 1997).  
        However, it is necessary to examine orthogonal polynomials, which provides a more robust 
method for assessing the functional form. When higher order polynomials are to be used to 
approximate highly nonlinear functions, use of orthogonal polynomials may provide a more 
robust approach.  
3.2.3 Orthogonal Polynomial RESET Test (OPRESET) 
            The types of orthogonal polynomial used will depend on the domain of the function. If 
the domain is from negative infinity to positive infinity, the Hermite polynomials are one option 
that can be used. If the domain is non-negative, then Laguerre polynomials are appropriate, and 
Legendre or Jacobi polynomials are appropriate if the domain is from zero to one (Kreyszig, 
1978). The focus here will be on Hermite polynomials, but other orthogonal polynomials can be 
utilized.   
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The general formula for a Hermite polynomial is given by (Kreyszig, 1978):  
𝐻𝑛(𝑡) = (−1)
𝑛𝑒𝑡
2 𝑑𝑛
𝑑𝑡𝑛
(𝑒−𝑡
2
), n = 1, 2, ….   (3) 
A better alternative formulation, is using the orthonormal sequence of Hermite polynomials that 
spans the space of square integrable functions (i.e. ),(2 L ). This sequence is given by: 
   
 
  )(
!2
1
)( 2/
2/1
2
xHe
n
xe n
x
n
n


, n = 0, 1, 2, …,                     (4) 
where the Hermite polynomial takes the following expanded form: 
  
 




N
j
jn
jn
j
n x
jnj
nxH
0
2
2
!2!
2
1!)( ,                             (5) 
where 2/nN   if n is even and 2/)1(  nN  if n is odd (Kreyszig, 1978). Explicit expressions 
for the first five Hermite polynomials are (Spiegel and Liu, 1999): 
 1)(0 xH ,          
 xxH 2)(1  ,          
 24)( 22  xxH ,         
 xxWH 128)( 33  , and        
 124816)( 244  xxWH .        
Figure 3 depicts the first three orthogonal polynomials )(xen  for n= 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 using 
equation (4). Any element in the space of square integrable functions, ),(2 L , which 
includes the predictor functions of interest, can be uniquely determined by a linear combination 
of the elements of the orthonormal sequence given by equation (5) (Kreyszig, 1978). Thus, by 
choosing a tolerable approximation error, a modeler then can essentially approximate the true 
predictor using a finite number of elements of the orthonormal sequence given by equation (5). 
 82 
 
The use of these polynomials can produce a much larger ‘neighborhood’ in which to probe for 
model misspecifications than traditional polynomials.  
We suggest using the orthogonal (Hermite) polynomials in place of the original 
polynomials in conducting functional form tests for the predictor or index function of the logistic 
regression model. As done in Bergtold et al. (2010), a modified RESET test can be used to test 
for the functional form of the predictor. They suggested using the regular polynomials of the 
fitted predictor function: ?̂? = 𝜂(𝐗𝒊; ?̂?) to test for nonlinearity by specifying an encompassing 
function: 
𝜂(𝐗𝒊; 𝜷) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1
′𝑥 + 𝛾1η̂
2 + 𝛾2η̂
3(+𝛾3η̂
4 + 𝛾4η̂
5)                           (6) 
Then, test the significance of the estimated parameter vector  𝜸 to assess if the predictor is 
misspecified. We advocate extending the robustness of this approach using orthogonal 
polynomials, specifically Hermite polynomials, to assess the functional form of the predictor 
function. This amounts to replacing the regular RESET terms using the fitted predictor values in 
equation (6) with:  
𝛾1 ∗ H(η̂)
2 + 𝛾2 ∗ H(η̂)
3 + 𝛾3 ∗ H(η̂)
4 + 𝛾4 ∗ H(η̂)
5+...,      (7) 
which can be extended to as many terms as are needed. The modeler would then test the 
following hypotheses: 
H0:   𝛾1=𝛾2=𝛾3=𝛾4=0   vs   H1:   𝛾𝑖=0 for at least one I = 1,2,3,4,… 
A standard likelihood-ratio test can be employed for the purpose of testing these hypotheses. The 
test takes the form:  
𝐿𝑅 =  −2 (𝐿𝑛𝐿0 − 𝐿𝑛 𝐿1) ~ 𝑥
2 
where 𝐿0is the likelihood function from the estimated (restricted) model and 𝐿1 is the likelihood 
function from the model including the RESET terms (unrestricted model) (Greene, 2012). 
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Another potential advantage of the RESET and OPRESET tests are that they require only a 
limited number of degrees of freedom to be conducted, potentially providing a more robust test 
in models with small samples.  
3.2.4 Simulation Experiment 
            A simulation was conducted to assess the OPRESET test compared to the RESET 
proposed by Bergtold et al. (2010) to determine their power in detecting potential functional 
misspecification of the predictor (or index) function. Data for the Monte Carlo Simulations was 
simulated using a two-step procedure following Bergtold et al. (2010) using the inverse 
conditional distribution of the explanatory variable(s) on the dependent variable. First, a random 
sample of the dependent variable (Yi) is generated of size N.  Using the dependent variable as a 
conditioning variable, the explanatory variables are randomly generated using the specified 
inverse conditional distribution(s). With multiple explanatory variables, a multivariate inverse 
conditional distribution was employed. To make the data generation more tractable, these 
distributions can be decomposed into products of conditional distributions, allowing one 
conditional random sample (realization) of size N of the multivariate distribution to be generated 
in a sequential manner.  The advantage of this data generation approach is that it allows for a 
purely statistical method to generate the data and provides exact formulas for the parameters, β, 
that can be derived as functions of the parameters of the inverse conditional distributions 
(Bergtold et al. 2010, Scrucca and Weisberg, 2004). 
To assess the power of the OPRESET and RESET type tests, four different cases are 
examined. The models for each case are provided in Table 1. The cases vary by functional form, 
type of explanatory variables, and level of multicollinearity. For each case, it was assumed the 
estimated logistic regression model had a predictor function linear in the explanatory variables 
and parameters, as is usually found in the applied literature. The OPRESET and RESET tests 
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were then used to assess if they could detect that this model was misspecified and arose from the 
underlying true model as specified in Table 1.           
Using the models in Table 1, Monte Carlo simulations were conducted for differing 
sample sizes of N = 50; 100; 250; 500; 1000; 2500; and 5000 to examine effects as sample size 
is increased.  Each Monte Carlo simulation was conducted using 1,000 replications. We conduct 
OPRESET tests up to order 5 (i.e. with up to 5th degree orthogonal polynomial expansion of the 
fitted predictor) and RESET tests up to order 3 (i.e. with up to a 3rd degree polynomial expansion 
of the fitted predictor). The null hypotheses for each of the tests are assumed to be rejected when 
the p-value for the likelihood ratio test statistic is less than 0.10, as suggested by Spanos (1999). 
Data generation, simulation and model estimation were all carried out in MATLAB. 
3.3. Results 
            Simulation results are reported in Table 2. Following McGuirk et al. (1993) we report 
the percentage of times the test rejects that the model is properly specified (i.e. correctly 
determines the model is misspecified) in 1000 replications, assuming a nominal test size of 5%. 
The results show the probative power of the misspecification test as sample sizes increase. That 
is, how often the null hypothesis is correctly rejected.  
            Overall, in small samples (less than 250 to 500 observation), simulation for both the 
RESET and OPRESET show that these misspecification tests have low power in detecting 
potential misspecification of the predictor function. This occurs more often in the cases with 
explanatory variables (covariates) that are non-normal and/or in the presence of near-
multicollinearity between the explanatory variables (covariates). When there are less than 500 
observations, it seems that the proposed test do not have enough probative power to provide 
conclusive results.  
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            The RESET test based on the approach suggested in Bergtold et al. (2010) does a 
relatively uniform job at detecting misspecification of the models, as sample size increases. The 
RESET based seems to do a better job at detecting misspecification when the predictor functions 
is quadratic or includes just simple interaction terms between the explanatory variables (with no 
transformations of the explanatory variables). RESET test provides a strong probative test for 
detecting potential missing interaction terms in the predictor function of the logistic regression 
model. In other cases, the probative power of the test seems to decline. In addition, the probative 
power of the tests seems to increase with the inclusion of higher order polynomials.  
            The OPRESET test, performed better on the more nonlinear case 2, compared to the 
RESET test.  This is likely due to the fact that the orthogonal polynomials can provide a better 
approximation to the underlying true model without the numerical collinearity problems that may 
arise when using regular polynomials. As with the RESET test, the probative power of the 
OPRESET test increases as higher order Hermite polynomials are included. Given that only 
Hermite polynomials were examined here, it may be the case that other orthogonal polynomials 
may provide more probative power. Compared to RESET, OPRESET test provides a better test 
for predicting linear predictors that incorporate transformations and (more nonlinear) interaction 
of the explanatory variables (or covariates).   
3.4. Conclusion 
            The purpose of this paper was to propose and examine a misspecification test for the 
specification of the predictor (index) function of the logistic regression model. A RESET type 
test following that proposed by Ramsey (1969) and Bergtold et al. (2010) using orthogonal 
polynomials was proposed and the probative power of the test at detecting model 
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misspecification was assed and compared to a more conventional RESET type test via 
simulation.  
            The RESET and OPRESET test do provide some probative power in detecting potential 
model misspecifications when sample sizes are larger (500+). The RESET test provides a 
stronger probative test for detecting potential missing simple interaction terms (e.g. squared 
terms or direct interactions between non-transformed explanatory variables) in the predictor 
function of the logistic regression model, while the OPRESET test provides a better test for 
predicting linear predictors that incorporate more nonlinear transformations of the explanatory 
variables (e.g. log) and nonlinear interactions of the explanatory variables. Both tests exhibited 
low power in small sample sizes, especially below 250 observations. Future research should look 
at examining additional functional forms to assess the probative power of these misspecification 
tests and other tests, such as the Lagrange Multiplier and Wald tests, to assess if they provide a 
better platform for misspecification testing.   
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Table 3.1. Misspecification Test Results by Functional Form 
Case  Description Cutoff Functional Form of the Predictor 
1 Logistic regression 
model with quadratic 
predictor function of 5 
normal covariates 
0.50 𝜂(𝑋𝑖; 𝛽) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋1 + 𝛽2𝑋2 + 𝛽3𝑋3 
+𝛽4𝑋4 + 𝛽5𝑋5 + 𝛽11𝑋1
2 + 𝛽12𝑋1𝑋2 
+𝛽13𝑋1𝑋3 + 𝛽14𝑋1𝑋4 + 𝛽15𝑋1𝑋5 + 𝛽22𝑋2
2 
+𝛽23𝑋2𝑋3 + 𝛽24𝑋2𝑋4 + 𝛽25𝑋2𝑋5 + 𝛽33𝑋3
2 
+𝛽34𝑋3𝑋4 + 𝛽35𝑋3𝑋5 + 𝛽44𝑋4
2 + 𝛽45𝑋4𝑋5 
+𝛽55𝑋5
2 
 
2 Logistic regression 
model with a nonlinear 
predictor function of 2 
covariates distributed 
Bernoulli and Gamma 
0.50 
 
𝜂(𝑋𝑖; 𝛽) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋1 + 𝛽2𝑋2 + 𝛽3ln (𝑋2) +
                    𝛽4𝑋1𝑋2+ 𝛽5𝑋1ln (𝑋2) 
3 Logistic regression 
model with quadratic 
predictor function of 2 
normal covariates with 
correlation between the 
two covariates of 0.75 
0.60 𝜂(𝑋𝑖; 𝛽) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋1 + 𝛽2𝑋2 + 𝛽3𝑋1
2 +  
                    𝛽4𝑋1𝑋2 + 𝛽5𝑋2
2 
4 Logistic regression 
model with a nonlinear 
predictor function of 2 
covariates distributed 
Bernoulli and 
Exponential 
0.50 𝜂(𝑋𝑖; 𝛽) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋1 + 𝛽2𝑋2 + 𝛽12𝑋1𝑋2 
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Table 3.2. Monte Carlo Simulation Results by Functional Form 
Individual Misspecification Tests With 1000 Runs: Percentage of Times Reject H0: assumption valid α = 0.05 
Case 1 2 
N  50 100 250 500 1000 2500 5000 50 100 250 500 1000 2500 5000 
Ramsey (2) 17.8 30.7 58.7 86.1 98.7 100.0 100.0 9.2 13.5 18.7 30.3 38.8 57.3 73.7 
Ramsey (3) 17.8 25.5 51.9 79.5 97.9 100.0 100.0 17.3 17.8 18.8 25.3 32.2 60.1 90.0 
OPReset (2) 8.6 17.6 42.3 73.6 96.7 100.0 100.0 6.4 13.9 38.1 71.3 95.1 100.0 100.0 
OPReset (3) 10.2 14.8 37.9 66.5 95.9 100.0 100.0 11.7 16.7 40.6 72.5 95.3 100.0 100.0 
OPReset (4) 13.7 16.4 34.9 61.2 93.8 100.0 100.0 16.3 18.8 37.5 69.7 94.6 100.0 100.0 
OPReset (5) 16.8 19.3 36.2 60.1 93.5 100.0 100.0 18.6 20.4 37.1 67.4 94.3 100.0 100.0 
Individual Misspecification Tests With 1000 Runs: Percentage of Times Reject H0: assumption valid α = 0.05 
(Continued) 
Case 3 4 
N  50 100 250 500 1000 2500 5000 50 100 250 500 1000 2500 5000 
Ramsey (2) 22.3 29.1 53.1 79.1 97.0 100.0 100.0 14.4 15.3 23.5 32.3 49.2 82.0 97.8 
Ramsey (3) 23.8 24.5 45.6 72.1 93.5 100.0 100.0 22.3 18.0 22.2 29.2 43.3 75.8 95.3 
OPReset (2) 9.4 11.9 30.5 59.5 88.9 99.6 100.0 5.1 7.9 6.3 9.1 14.1 30.3 52.7 
OPReset (3) 11.0 12.9 31.7 58.2 88.1 99.8 100.0 8.7 9.9 7.9 10.0 13.4 29.6 52.7 
OPReset (4) 15.9 16.7 31.0 55.5 84.4 99.8 100.0 11.0 11.7 12.2 14.5 22.4 49.5 82.2 
OPReset (5) 18.6 17.2 28.4 52.9 82.1 99.7 100.0 15.3 13.6 12.3 14.9 22.7 51.6 82.6 
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Figure 3.3. Functions  )(xen  for n = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 involving Hermite Polynomials 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
